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THE LAW OF OTHER STATES
Eric A. Posner* and Cass R. Sunstein"*
The question of whether courts should consult the laws of "other states" has
produced intense controversy. But in some ways, this practice is entirely routine;
within the United States, state courts regularly consult the decisions of other state
courts in deciding on the common law, the interpretation of statutory law, and
even the meaning of state constitutions. A formal argument in defense of such
consultation stems from the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which says that under
certain conditions, a widespread belief accepted by a number of independent
actors, is highly likely to be correct. It follows that if a large majority of states
make a certain decision based on a certain shared belief and the states are well
motivated, there is good reason to believe that the decision is correct. For the
Jury Theorem to apply, however, three conditions must be met: states must be
making judgments based on private information; states must be relevantly
similar; and states must be making decisions independently, rather than
mimicking one another. An understanding of these conditions offers qualified
support for the domestic practice of referring to the laws of other states, while
also raising some questions about the Supreme Court's reference to the laws of
other nations. It is possible, however, to set out the ingredients of an approach
that high courts might follow, at least if we make certain assumptions about the
legitimate sources of interpretation. Existing practice, at the domestic and
international levels, suggests that many courts are now following an implicit
Condorcetian logic.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following cases:
1. The Supreme Court of Texas is deciding whether to give a broad reading
to the "public policy exception" to its general rule that employment is at will. 1
The court is concerned that a broad reading, which would intrude on the ability
of employers to manage the workplace, might have serious adverse effects on
the economy of Texas. Because of that concern, the court investigates the
practices of other states. It notices that most state courts have read the public
policy exception broadly, and have done so without causing noticeable adverse
effects on the economies of their states. Influenced by those decisions, the court
adopts a broad reading of the public policy exception.
2. The Supreme Court of Vermont is deciding whether to rule that under its
state constitution, discrimination on the basis of sex is subject to "strict
scrutiny," which would ensure that such discrimination would almost always be
struck down. The Supreme Court of Vermont consults the practices of other
states and discovers that the overwhelming majority of state courts interpret
their constitutions so as to subject sex discrimination to strict scrutiny. It
follows the practice of that overwhelming majority.
1. On the public policy exception, see Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law
and the Search for Third-Party Effects, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1943 (1996). On the phenomenon of
interstate citations in this particular domain, see David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and
Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from State Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31
LAW & Soc'y REv. 337 (1997).
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3. The Supreme Court of the United States is deciding to rule whether
government may execute people under the age of eighteen. 2 Believing that the
question is difficult, the Court decides to consult the practices of other nations.
3
It happens that few nations impose the death penalty on people under the age of
eighteen. Influenced by this, the Court rules that the United States may not
constitutionally do so.
The practice of consulting "foreign precedents" has received a great deal of
attention in connection with recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States.4 In those decisions, the Court has referred to comparative law in
deciding whether a statute or state practice violates the U.S. Constitution.5 The
6references have proved exceptionally controversial. But in some ways, it is
quite standard to refer to the decisions of other jurisdictions, and the debate
over the references of the Supreme Court should be understood in the context
of that standard practice. Within the United States, for example, state courts
2. This is, of course, the issue in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which held,
with reference to international practice, that capital punishment for crimes committed by
juveniles violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
3. See id. at 574-79.
4. See Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources To Interpret the Constitution,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (2004); Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution,
POL'Y REV., June-July 2005, at 33; Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The
Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the
Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005); Rex D. Glensy,
Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign Persuasive
Authority, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 357 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, 2004
Term-Comment: Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119
HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespecting the "Opinions of Mankind":
International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 261 (2005); Sanford
Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some Reflections, 39
TEX. INT'L L.J. 353 (2004); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional
Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999); Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional
Law, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 239 (2003); Jeremy Waldron, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-
Comment: Foreign Law and the Modern lus Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129 (2005); Ernest
A. Young, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Comment: Foreign Law and the Denominator
Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005). A recent article by Mark Tushnet provides a
comprehensive and concise overview of the debate. See Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing
Less Better Than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court
Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006) [hereinafter Tushnet, Knowing
Less]. A bill in the House would forbid courts to rely on foreign law. See Reaffirmation of
American Independence Resolution, H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004).
5. In recent years, the Court has referred to foreign precedents on several occasions.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-77; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568-74 (2003); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S.
990, 991-93 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944-45 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997)
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 863-64 (1997); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 945 n. 1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
6. See supra notes 4-5.
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frequently refer to the judgments of other state courts in ruling on questions of
private and public law, and indeed in ruling on the meaning of state
constitutions. Significant numbers of out-of-state citations have been found in
Arkansas, 8 New York,9 Kansas,' Ohio," Montana, 12 California, 13 and North
Carolina, 14 among others. 15 A study of twelve states found that state courts
cited out-of-state courts in no less than 34.8% of their decisions, with
substantially higher percentages in Massachusetts, Arizona, and Vermont. 16 It
7. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 498-99 (Ky. 1992)
(invalidating state sodomy statute after citing for support other state court constitutional
decisions from New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Texas); see also Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional
Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15, 19-20 (2004).
8. See A. Michael Beaird, Citations to Authority by the Arkansas Appellate Courts,
1950-2000, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 301, 334, 336 (2003) (finding 1508 out-of-state
case citations by Arkansas Supreme Court, out of 15,128 total case citations for the period
1950-2000).
9. See William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals: A
Millennium Update, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 1273, 1301 (2001) (finding out-of-state citations
accounting for 27.7% of case citations in 1999 and 22.3% in 2000).
10. See Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas
Court of Appeals, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120, 121 (1998) (finding sister state citations by
the Kansas Supreme Court to be 13.9% of all case citations in 1995).
11. See James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate
Decisions Published in 1990, 86 LAW LIBR. J. 129, 137-38 (1994) (finding that 8.9% of all
cases cited by the Ohio Supreme Court in 1990 were to sister states).
12. See Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT.
L. REv. 453, 462 (1996) (finding 7% of case citations by the Montana Supreme Court were
to sister states in 1994, which was significantly lower than the percentage of sister state case
citations in 1954-1955 and 1914-1915).
13. See John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of
the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL.
L. REv. 381, 389-91 (1977) (finding 13% out-of-state citations in 1950, 12% in 1960, and
6.3% in 1970).
14. See Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical
Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 39, 58 (1979) (finding that 239 of 3055 citations in 139
opinions were to other state courts, in a study of North Carolina Supreme Court decisions
published in 1977).
15. See David Blumberg, Influence of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on
State High Court Decisionmaking 1982-1997: A Study in Horizontal Federalism, 61 ALB. L.
REv. 1583 (1998); Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style
and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REv. 773 (1981).
16. See James N.G. Cauthen, Horizontal Federalism in the New Judicial Federalism: A
Preliminary Look at Citations, 66 ALB. L. REv. 783, 790 (2003) (analyzing the citation
practices of the highest state courts in Arizona, California, Florida, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas (both the
Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals), and Vermont); see also
Patrick Baude, Interstate Dialogue in State Constitutional Law, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 835, 838
(1997). An interesting study can be found in Douglas A. Hedin, The Quicksands of
Originalism: Interpreting Minnesota's Constitutional Past, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 241
(2003) (discussing citations of other state courts by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
interpreting provisions of the Minnesota Constitution derived from out-of-state constitutions,
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is not taken to be illegitimate, or even controversial, for one state to consult the
practices of others in deciding on the meaning of the state's founding
document. 17  On the contrary, "comparative law" is a routine and
uncontroversial feature of the jurisprudence of state courts. 18
Many national courts regularly consult "foreign precedents" in deciding on
the meaning of their own constitutions.19 The Supreme Court of Ireland cites
20foreign law with some frequency. Between 1994 and 1998, South African
Supreme Court and Constitutional Court decisions made no fewer "than 1258
references to American, Canadian, British, German, European, and Indian
courts." 2 1 The Supreme Court of Israel makes heavy use of foreign law in
multiple domains. 2 2 At least in some cases, German courts consult foreign
courts as well.23 Canadian courts hardly restrict themselves to Canadian
precedents, 24 and Australian courts reach far and wide.2 5 Use of foreign law
also occurs, if tacitly, in Italy and France. 26 In Britain the practice is common,
and it appears to be growing over time.2 7 Consultation of foreign law seems to
be the rule, not the exception.
and showing diminution of out-of-state citations over time).
17. See Gregory A. Caldeira, Legal Precedent: Structures of Communication Between
State Supreme Courts, 10 Soc. NETWORKS 29 (1988); Hedin, supra note 16.
18. For a reputational ranking, based on citations, see Gregory A. Caldeira, On the
Reputation of State Supreme Courts, 5 POL. BEHAV. 83, 87-94 (1983).
19. A great deal of relevant information can be found in THE USE OF COMPARATIVE
LAW BY COURTS (Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef van Erp eds., 1999).
20. See Bruce Carolan, The Search for Coherence in the Use of Foreign Court
Judgments by the Supreme Court of Ireland, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 123, 137 (2004).
21. See Sir Basil Markesinis & Jbrg Fedtke, The Judge as Comparatist, 80 TUL. L.
REV. 11, 57-58 (2005). The authors expanded their article into a book, see SIR BASIL
MARKESINIS & JORG FEDTKE, JUDICIAL RECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW: A NEW SOURCE OF
INSPIRATION? (2006), which contains much new and valuable material, but because it was
published during the page proof stage of this Article, we have not been able to rely on it. All
references below are to the Tulane article. See also Hoyt Webb, The Constitutional Court of
South Africa: Rights Interpretation and Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 205 (1998).
22. See Ren~e Sanilevici, The Use of Comparative Law by Israeli Courts, in THE USE
OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS, supra note 19, at 197. For several examples from the
domain of rights, see ISRAEL LAW REPORTS 1992-1994 (Jonathan Davidson ed., 2002).
23. See Markesinis & Fedtke, supra note 21, at 34-45.
24. See S. Ian Bushnell, The Use of American Cases, 35 U.N.B. L.J. 157 (1986); H.
Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261 (1987); J. M. Macintyre, The Use
of American Cases in Canadian Courts, 2 U.B.C. L. REv. 478 (1966); Peter McCormick,
Judicial Authority and the Provincial Courts of Appeal: A Statistical Investigation of
Citation Practices, 22 MAN. L.J. 286 (1993).
25. See Russell Smyth, What Do Intermediate Appellate Courts Cite? A Quantitative
Study of the Citation Practice of Australian State Supreme Courts, 21 ADEL. L. REV. 51
(1999).
26. See Markesinis & Fedtke, supra note 21, at 26-30 (noting that Italian and French
courts do not cite foreign sources but extrinsic evidence suggests they are influenced by
them).
27. See id at 30-34.
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Our goal here is to set out a framework for assessing the question of
whether courts should consult the practices of other states, either domestically
or nationally. Our starting point is admittedly unusual: the Condorcet Jury
Theorem. 28 As we use it here, the Jury Theorem formalizes the simple intuition
that the practices of others provide relevant information, and that courts ought
not to ignore such information. We suggest that the Jury Theorem provides the
simplest argument for following the practices of other states: it suggests that if
the majority of states believe that X is true, there is reason to believe that X is in
fact true. In our view, the Jury Theorem also provides the foundation not only
for following the practices of other states, but also for seeing when and why it
is hazardous to do so. In particular, the Jury Theorem suggests that the
practices of other states provide useful information when three conditions are
met: those practices reflect the judgment of the affected population or decision-
makers; the other state is sufficiently similar; and the judgment embodied in the
practice of the other state is independent.
In supplying a governing framework, we attempt to give structure to a
debate that so far has consisted mainly of ad hoc (though often reasonable and
illuminating) arguments for or against following the practices of other states.
Our hope is that this framework might have broad applicability to many
situations in which legal authorities are deciding whether to consult the
decisions of other legal actors. Suppose, for example, that it is ultimately
agreed that in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court
should not consult the practices of other nations. It may remain possible that
other high courts, interpreting their own constitutions, should consult such
practices. The analysis here might justify and inform such consultation. The
same analysis might apply not only to state courts operating domestically, but
also to judgments by legislatures, of states or of nations, that are deciding
whether to follow the majority view of apparently relevant others.29 In
structuring a program to protect endangered species, the legislature of Montana
may or may not want to follow the general practices of other state legislatures;
in deciding on national energy policy, or in seeking to control global warming,
28. See CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS (Keith Michael Baker ed., 1976).
Importantly, the Theorem does not apply only to binary decisions; it can be extended to
decision-making when there are multiple issues (rather than a single yes or no question) and
the outcome is chosen by a plurality. See Christian List & Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic
Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 277 (2001). For
helpful overviews, see ROBERT E. GOODIN, REFLECTIVE DEMOCRACY 94-96 (2005); DENNIS
C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 129 (3d ed. 2003).
29. Note in this regard that Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, a critic of judicial
reliance on foreign decisions, finds it "entirely appropriate for our elected representatives in
the Congress or the State legislatures to consider how lawmakers in other countries have
approached problems when our representatives write the laws of the United States ......
Alberto Gonzales, Attorney Gen., Prepared Remarks at the University of Chicago Law
School (Nov. 9 2005) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/
agspeech_0511092.html).
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Congress may or may not want to adopt the approaches of other nations. For
such judgments, the Condorcet Jury Theorem provides a helpful place to start.
Four clarifications before we begin: First, we assume initially that judges
can interpret foreign materials both easily and adequately. It is important to see
how the analysis should proceed if judges could undertake it properly; but of
course there is no assurance that they can. In Part VI, we will discuss the extent
to which more realistic assumptions about judicial capacities would complicate
our basic claims, and perhaps justify a departure from them in the interest of
easy administration. Second, we are concerned with the use of foreign
decisions as relevant information for resolving disputes, not with the use of
foreign decisions as "precedent"; indeed, we do not believe that anyone seeks
to use foreign decisions in that way. 30 Third, we assume that the Supreme
Court has been candid about its reasons for using foreign sources, and so the
controversy is over doctrine and not judicial rhetoric. 3 1 The fact that state
courts regularly use "foreign" sources in the same way that the Supreme Court
has done provides some assurance on this count.
Finally, we hope that our analysis will prove useful to people with diverse
views about the proper interpretation of the Constitution. It is tempting and to
some extent correct to think that originalism, 32 by itself, excludes reference to
foreign precedents; if the Constitution means what it originally meant, the
contemporary practices of foreign nations are usually immaterial.33 And
indeed, our analysis will help show why, exactly, those with different
approaches to constitutional interpretation reach different conclusions about the
relevance of foreign law. But at least in some cases, our conclusions should be
attractive to originalists as well as to those who reject originalism or prefer
some middle way. Whenever the Court has to make a factual or moral inquiry
30. There are tricky jurisprudential questions here, to be sure. Ernest Young argues
that a court treats foreign decisions as authoritative if they are "deferring to numbers, not
reasons," Young, supra note 4, at 155, relying on Joseph Raz's argument that an institution
has authority when others defer to its judgments not because of its reasons but because of its
epistemic advantages, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 35 (1986). Perhaps this
is so, but it seems odd to say that the body of foreign legislation and decisions has
"authority," just as it is odd to say that a public opinion poll has authority. But the debate
should not be a semantic one. What is really at stake is not a semantic or even jurisprudential
question, but whether judicial decisions will be improved if judges consult foreign materials
for additional information and use that information to make their decisions. We do not think
it matters if this practice is labeled as giving "authority" to foreign courts or not.
31. For the latter view, see Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term-
Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 88-89 (2005). For criticism of this
view, see Tushnet, Knowing Less, supra note 4.
32. For an outline, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
33. See Gonzales, supra note 29. Consider in particular Attorney General Gonzales's
suggestion that it is appropriate to consult English sources to carry "out the original political
will reflected in the Constitution," and the contrasting claim that the "present trend" reflects
an illegitimate effort "to consider evolving, contemporary legal judgments and policy
preferences of other nations." Id.
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that is required by original understanding, then the framework provided by the
Jury Theorem provides a useful place to start.34 Of course some theories of
constitutional interpretation will be relatively less willing to ask about the
factual and moral questions on which comparative law might bear, and we shall
pay considerable attention to variations on that count.
Our emphasis is normative, but the central argument has positive as well as
normative implications. Indeed, we are willing to hypothesize that an implicit
understanding of the Condorcetian argument helps explain a wide range of
existing practices, including the fact that state courts consult the legal materials
of other state courts more than national courts consult the legal materials of
foreign courts, and the fact that national courts in young nations consult the
legal materials of foreign courts more frequently than do national courts in
older nations. In Part VII, we derive some specific testable hypotheses from the
Condorcet approach, provide tentative support for those hypotheses, and
suggest other ways that they could be evaluated empirically.
I. THE JURY THEOREM AND FOLLOWING OTHER STATES
A. A Heated Controversy
It is an understatement to say that consultation of foreign precedents by the
Supreme Court has produced intense controversy. In introducing a "sense of the
Senate" resolution condemning such consultation, for example, Senator John
Cornyn proclaimed that "the American people may be slowly losing control
over the meaning of our laws and of our Constitution." 35 Indeed, "foreign
governments may even begin to dictate what our laws and our Constitution
mean, and what our policies in America should be." 36 In Senator Comyn's
view, what is "especially disconcerting is that some judges today may be
departing so far from American law, from American principles, and from
American traditions, that the only way they can justify their rulings from the
bench is to cite the law of foreign countries, foreign governments, and foreign
cultures-because there is nothing in this country left for them to cite for
support." 37 The controversy has clearly become both partisan and ideological;
Supreme Court Justices who support the practice have even received death
34. Tushnet provides one example: if the proper original interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment requires courts to determine evolving norms, this is a factual inquiry that would
benefit from consultation of foreign decisions, at least if evolving norms are not merely
those internal to the United States. See Tushnet, Knowing Less, supra note 4, at 1279-80. But
the value of comparative law for originalists is broader than this. To the extent that any
original understanding requires courts to measure the extent to which a law burdens some
behavior (speech, religious practice, commerce, etc.), the experience of foreign states with
similar rules should be relevant.
35. 151 CONG. REc. S3109 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
36. Id.
37. Id. at S3109-10.
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threats. 38 Notably, both of the most recent Supreme Court appointees--Chief
Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito-explicitly rejected the practice,
notwithstanding their general unwillingness to speak to current controversies.39
But why, exactly, has the practice created such hostility?
We offer two hypotheses. First, consideration of foreign law is seen as a
subterfuge. Judges pretend to exercise self-restraint by deferring to legal
authorities, but by abandoning American precedents in favor of foreign ones,
they obtain a license for advancing liberal views that prevail mainly in Europe.
On this view, the practice is an elaborate show of false humility that
simultaneously extols Europeans, denigrates Americans, and permits judges to
implement their personal preferences. Consideration of foreign law turns out to
be a form of lawlessness, all the worse insofar as it compromises American
sovereignty. Second, consideration of foreign law implicitly denies American
exceptionalism and everything that accompanies it-national pride, celebration
of the founding, the notion that America has a distinctive and unique mission,
and so forth.40 Use of foreign law implicitly treats America as merely one
nation among others, rather than as a shining city on the hill that serves as a
model for other nations. On this view, the United States should be a leader, not
a follower, and use of foreign precedents turns the nation into a follower. Worst
of all, the practice encourages judges to express humility toward foreigners
rather than to the founding document and those who ratified it.
Undoubtedly political leaders of various sorts have a stake in exaggerating
the nature of the Court's practice. If the Court is taken as allowing "foreign
governments ... to dictate what our laws and our Constitution mean,"4 1 and if
leaders are seen as resisting foreign dictation, their own visibility and electoral
prospects may be enhanced. But Senator Cornyn nonetheless offers a legitimate
challenge, one that deserves a careful response. Why should the U.S. Supreme
Court attend to the decisions of other high courts? Indeed, why should the
Supreme Court of California attend to the decisions of the supreme courts of
other states, with their distinctive practices, laws, and traditions?
38. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address Before South
African Constitutional Court (Feb. 7, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.concourt.gov.za/site/ginsberg.html).
39. See Adam Liptak & Adam Nagoumey, Judge Alito the Witness Proves a Powerful
Match for Senate Questioners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at A27 (discussing testimony of
both Roberts and Alito).
40. For an overview, see AMERICAN EXCEPTONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael
Ignatieff ed., 2005).
41. 151 CONG. REC. S3109 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005) (statement of Sen. Comyn).
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B. Decisions and Information
The simplest answer is that the decisions of other courts provide relevant
information. 4 2 If thirty state courts have decided in favor of strict liability for
certain kinds of torts, and no state courts have decided otherwise, there might
seem to be reason for a state court to rule in favor of strict liability for those
kinds of torts. If the high courts of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Australia
have all decided that the free speech principle includes commercial advertising,
there might seem to be reason for the Supreme Court of Ireland to reach the
same conclusion.
This informational rationale has been advanced by several Supreme Court
Justices. Justice Ginsburg, for example, argues that:
Foreign opinions.., can add to the store of knowledge relevant to the solution
of trying questions. Yes, we should approach foreign legal materials with
sensitivity to our differences, deficiencies, and imperfect understanding, but
imperfection, I believe, should not lead us to abandon the effort to learn what
we can from the experience and good thinking foreign sources may convey.
Representative of the perspective I share with four of my current
colleagues, Patricia M. Wald, once Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit and former Judge on the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, last year said with characteristic
wisdom: "It's hard for me to see that the use of foreign decisional law is an
up-or-down proposition. I see it rather as a pool of potential and useful
information and thought that must be mined with caution and restraint.
' 4 3
We think that this argument points in the right direction, and that Justice
Ginsburg is also right to emphasize "our differences, deficiencies, and
imperfect understanding" as important qualifications of her claim. Indeed, our
42. The political science literature on "policy diffusion" examines the related
phenomenon: why governments (not courts) imitate policies adopted by other governments.
One hypothesis is that the adoption of policies by another government provides information
about the value of these policies. See, e.g., Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry,
Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy Research, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS
169 (Paul A. Sabatier ed., 1999). For an application to the international setting, see Kurt
Weyland, Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform, 57
WORLD POL. 262 (2005).
43. Ginsburg, supra note 38. This is also the thrust of Justice Breyer's informal
remarks in his debate with Justice Scalia over the use of foreign law. See Antonin Scalia &
Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justices, U.S. Supreme Court, Debate at American University:
Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1352357/posts). By contrast, although she may
not disagree with this rationale, Justice O'Connor has stressed the importance of concerns
akin to comity-the United States will have more influence on other countries if U.S. courts
draw on other countries' legal materials. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Assoc. Justice, U.S.
Supreme Court, Remarks at the Southern Center for International Studies (Oct. 28, 2003)
(transcript available at www.southerncenter.org/OConnor-transcript.pdf) ("When U.S.
courts are seen to be cognizant of other judicial systems, our ability to act as a rule-of-law
model for other nations will be enhanced."). We do not take a position on this view.
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claims here might even be seen as an effort to elaborate the argument that she
has briefly sketched. The gap is that neither Justice Ginsburg nor Judge Wald
explains how this information pooling mechanism works or exactly why
"differences, deficiencies, and imperfect understanding" create important
problems. The Jury Theorem attempts to discipline their intuitions. It suggests
that under certain conditions, and with relevant qualifications, the rulings of
other states do indeed provide exceptionally valuable information for use by
judicial and other institutions.
To see how the Jury Theorem works, suppose that people are answering
the same question with two possible answers, one false and one true. Assume
too that the probability that each voter will answer correctly exceeds 50%, and
that these probabilities are independent. The Jury Theorem says that the
probability of a correct answer, by a majority of the group, increases toward
100% as the size of the group increases. The key point is that groups will do
better than individuals, and large groups better than small ones, so long as two
conditions are met: majority rule is used and each person is more likely than
not to be correct.
The Theorem is based on some fairly simple arithmetic. Suppose, for
example, that there is a three-person group in which each member has a 67%
probability of being right. The probability that a majority vote will produce the
correct answer is 74%. As the size of the group increases, this probability
increases too. It should be clear that as the likelihood of a correct answer by
individual members increases, the likelihood of a correct answer by the group
i-creases as well, at least if majority rule is used. If group members are 80%
likely to be right, and if the group contains ten or more people, the probability
of a correct answer by the majority is overwhelmingly high-very close to
100%. 44  In countless domains, imperfectly informed individuals and
institutions adopt a heuristic in favor of following the majority of relevant
others (the "do-what-the-majority-do" heuristic 45); and this heuristic reflects
the logic of the Jury Theorem.
44. For a lucid discussion of the Jury Theorem, and its application to legal problems,
see Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. 327 (2002).
45. See Joseph Henrich et al., Group Report: What Is the Role of Culture in Bounded
Rationality?, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 343, 344 (Gerd
Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten eds., 2001) ("Cultural transmission capacities allow
individuals to shortcut the costs of search, experimentation, and data processing algorithms,
and instead benefit from the cumulative experience stored in the minds (and observed in the
behavior) of others."); Kevin N. Laland, Imitation, Social Learning, and Preparedness as
Mechanisms of Bounded Rationality, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX,
supra, at 233.
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C. The Basic Argument
It should be easy to see how the Jury Theorem might be invoked to support
use of the law of other states. Suppose that the Supreme Court of Texas is
deciding whether to adopt rule A or instead rule B. Suppose too that the vast
majority of states have adopted rule A. If we assume that each state is more
likely than not to make the right decision, in the sense of being well motivated
and more likely than not correct in its beliefs, then there is good reason to
believe that the Supreme Court of Texas should, in fact, adopt rule A. When
states are deciding on appropriate policies, it is at least reasonable to assume
that each is, or most are, likely to do better than random, which is an adequate
basis for analyzing the question in terms of the Jury Theorem. At least at first
glance, the point applies to constitutional law no less than to statutory and
common law.4 6 If a state court is deciding on the meaning of its own due
process clause, it might well consult the decisions of other state courts, simply
because the majority view, under the stated assumptions, has a high probability
of being correct.
This argument is easiest to accept if we can assume without controversy
that there is a right answer to the question whether a state should prefer rule A
or rule B. Suppose that the choice between the two turns on a disputed question
of fact. For example, will rule A cause significant unemployment effects on the
state's economy? Will rule B increase prices, or increase the incidence of racial
discrimination? If the court is focusing on a factual question, and if a majority
of states has answered that question a certain way, the court has some reason to
believe that the majority view is correct. We might therefore arrive at a simple
conclusion: where the choice of legal rule turns on an answer to a disputed
factual question, the practice of a substantial majority of states should be
followed, at least as a presumption. The conventional practice in state courts-
of consulting and often following the clear majority view-is easily understood
and defended in these terms.
Suppose, however, that the question is not simply or largely one of fact.
Perhaps it is largely a moral question; perhaps the state wants to know whether
it is morally acceptable to ban same-sex relationships, to refuse to protect an
asserted right to housing or healthcare, or to execute juveniles. (Let us simply
stipulate that the question of moral acceptability is relevant to the legal
judgment; we will return to that stipulation below.) If we are skeptics about
morality, and believe that moral questions do not have right answers, then it is
pointless to care what other states do; it is also difficult to see how a state court
could go about answering the relevant question. But if we are not skeptics, and
if we believe that moral questions do have right answers, then it makes sense to
46. We explore below why the first glance might be misleading. In brief, if the
meaning of a constitutional provision is a matter of uncovering the original understanding,
the views of other states may not be terribly informative. Interestingly, however, states
nonetheless consult other states in interpreting their own constitutions. See supra notes 7-18.
[Vol. 59:131
THE LAW OF OTHER STA TES
consult the majority's view. Most ambitiously, we might believe that moral
questions simply have right answers as such, and hence the view of most states
is probative of what is right. Less ambitiously, we might believe that the right
answer to a moral question sometimes turns on the right answer to factual
questions, and the view of most states is probative on that count as well.
It is imaginable, for example, that the right answer to a question about
same-sex relationships depends, in part, on whether children will be harmed by
permitting such relationships. Or suppose that the legitimacy of capital
punishment for juveniles depends, in part, on whether such punishment has a
significant deterrent effect on juveniles. The practices of most states might be
taken to provide some evidence on these questions. As a single practice obtains
widespread support, the likelihood that it is right might appear to be very high.
D. An Initial Puzzle and Underlying Assumptions
This, then, is the core of a reasonable argument for consulting the law of
other states. But when and how the Jury Theorem can be applied to that
practice of consultation depends on whether the assumptions underlying the
Theorem apply. An initial puzzle is whose votes should count, or what we will
call the who votes? problem. Suppose that a court seeks to determine whether
some law, X, has some desirable effect, Y. The court observes that a majority of
other states have enacted law X, but it also discovers that, in the aggregate,
more legislators oppose X than support it-in the states with X, a bare majority
of legislators voted in favor of the law, while in states without X, nearly all
legislators voted against the law. Should the court count the states with law X
or the legislators who voted for X? Or suppose that polls show that the majority
of populations in all states oppose X while the majority of legislators voted for
X. Should the court count the legislators or the people? Similarly, should courts
that look at outcomes in other courts count the number of judge-votes or the
number of court-votes? These complications can be multiplied.
In principle, the who votes? question is easily answered. From the
Condorcetian perspective, the court should focus on the people who have the
best relevant information. Suppose that foreign legislators focus on the
deterrent effect of the juvenile death penalty, foreign populations focus on its
moral permissibility, and foreign courts focus on its consistency with local law.
If so, then an American court that cares only about the deterrence issue should
count the legislators rather than the other agents. In practice, it may be difficult
for courts to make such fine distinctions. The motives of legislators, the
thinking of populations, and the workings of government are sufficiently
opaque to foreigners that it is probably appropriate to rely only on the
authoritative outcomes--duly enacted legislation, judicial opinions-and
ignore the rest.
For the Condorcetian argument to work, moreover, each state, or most
states, must be more likely than not to make the right choice. The arithmetic
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has some complexity here,4 7 but the intuition is simple: if each state is more
likely to be wrong than right, then the likelihood of an incorrect answer, from a
majority of states, approaches 100% as the size of the group expands. If
Massachusetts has reason to believe that states are likely to err on the question
of same-sex marriage (perhaps for reasons of what Condorcet himself called
"prejudice"48), then it might choose to ignore the majority view. If the United
States believes that most nations are likely to blunder on a question of free
speech, or antitrust law, then the Jury Theorem argues in favor of ignoring their
practice-or perhaps even doing the opposite of what they do. We shall refer to
this point at various stages below. For the moment, we focus on three less
obvious assumptions, each of which may or may not hold in relevant contexts.
First, a foreign state's law must reflect a judgment based on that state's
private information about how some question is best answered. Otherwise, the
law is not analogous to a vote that aggregates information. We will also address
the possibility that the judgment reflects the hidden preferences of the voters
rather than hidden facts that they know. In the former case, there may still be an
argument for relying on foreign law, but it is weaker than in the latter case.
4 9
Second, a foreign state's law must address a problem that is similar to the
problem before the domestic court. This similarity condition refers not only to
the facts (does the foreign state have a similar crime problem?) but also to the
legal principles, institutions, and values of the foreign state. Otherwise, the
foreign law is not analogous to a vote on the same issue. It is possible, of
course, that pertinent differences between the foreign and domestic arenas
make the foreign judgment irrelevant to the issue at hand. Perhaps other states
do not allow same-sex marriage, but perhaps they are relevantly different from
Massachusetts, whose Supreme Judicial Court might therefore feel free to
ignore the consensus judgment.50 It is here, we shall suggest, that different
views about constitutional interpretation, and its proper sources, can lead to
different judgments about the relevance of foreign law. The Constitutional
Court of Germany, for example, might believe that a moral judgment bears on
the meaning of a constitutional guarantee, whereas another high court might
reject that belief.
Third, and perhaps most interestingly, the law of the foreign state must
reflect an independent judgment; it must not be a matter of merely following
other states. If the foreign law exists because the foreign state mimicked some
other state, then the law would not count as an independent vote, as required by
47. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE
(2006).
48. MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory
of Decision-Making, in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 28, at 65.
49. This corresponds to the two main Condorcet Jury Theorem models emphasized by
Edelman: the polling model and the information aggregation model. See Edelman, supra
note 44, at 332-34.
50. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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the Jury Theorem. When this condition is violated, we will say that foreign law
reflects a cascade effect.5 1 The problem with a cascade effect is that a state,
apparently contributing to information about what must be done, is actually
following the relevant judgments of others. To the extent that states and nations
are participating in cascades, they are undermining a key assumption on which
consultation of foreign law depends. The possibility of cascade effects weakens
the argument, not only for following other courts, but more generally for
following the practices of other states and nations, including legislatures and
administrative agencies.
52
For a preliminary sense of the nature of these conditions, consider the
question in Roper v. Simmons53 itself, which was whether the juvenile death
penalty is "cruel and unusual."54 The issue is whether we should consider the
abolition (or the lack) of the juvenile death penalty in most other countries as
relevant information for the Supreme Court of the United States. Suppose, first,
that the issue that the Court cares about is whether the juvenile death penalty
deters juvenile crime. (We do not claim that this issue was crucial to the
Court's decision, though the Court mentioned the point.55 ) Can the Court
plausibly conclude that nearly all other nations have expressed an independent
judgment that the juvenile death penalty does not deter crime-and that
therefore the probability that the juvenile death penalty deters crime is very
low, perhaps close to zero?
The first condition says that the Court should ignore states that, say,
abolished the juvenile death penalty for explicitly moral, religious, or
ideological reasons independent of any juvenile crime problem. The reason is
that the abolition of the penalty did not reflect a judgment about the relevant
issue here, whether the juvenile death penalty deters. The second condition says
that the Court should ignore states that do not have a juvenile crime problem-
perhaps because families or clans have much more control over children than
families do in the United States. The third condition says that the Court should
ignore states that abolished the juvenile death penalty merely because other
states abolished the juvenile death penalty. The abolition by the later states
51. See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity,
Fads, and Informational Cascades, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1998, at 151.
52. The independence condition is, in fact, subsumed by the judgment condition: if the
decisionmaker relies on private information, then she does not rely on the votes of others.
But we treat these conditions separately because they emphasize different aspects of the
inquiry. The judgment condition instructs the decisionmaker to make sure that the decision
could be based on private information because it is the type of decision that reflects private
information (for example, about local facts). The independence condition instructs the
decisionmaker to ignore a decision that could have been based on private information if there
is reason to believe that the foreign decisionmaker ignored its private information and
instead took part in a cascade.
53. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
54. Id. at 561.
55. Id. at 561-62.
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does not provide additional information about whether the juvenile death
penalty deters.
Note that whether and how these conditions apply depends heavily on how
the question is framed. Suppose that the Court does not care whether the
juvenile death penalty deters but sees itself as determining whether the juvenile
death penalty is immoral or in some other way a violation of evolving social
norms. The question now is not whether the juvenile death penalty deters
(though this may remain a relevant consideration) but whether other states'
laws provide information about the evolving norms with respect to the morality
of the juvenile death penalty. The first condition requires that the foreign states
have in fact made a moral judgment (which may be hard to ascertain) and also
that the foreign states have private information about the morality of the
juvenile death penalty (which may or may not seem unlikely). The second
condition requires that the foreign states regard the juvenile death penalty as a
moral issue, and also that moral norms in the foreign states be similar to those
in the United States. The third condition requires that the foreign states, as
before, not merely mimic the laws of other states.
We now turn to a more detailed discussion of these points.
II. THE JUDGMENT CONDITION
The Jury Theorem requires that the voter have private information and then
vote sincerely on the basis of it. There are two points here. First, the voter must
have private information. Second, the voter must sincerely reveal this
information. Let us consider these points with more care, and see how they
apply to states.
The first point is that the voter (the foreign state, here) has private
information. In our running example, it must be the case that, say, Germany
abolished the juvenile death penalty because the government had information,
not available to other countries (or, in our example, the United States), about
the juvenile death penalty. The type of information depends on context. As our
juvenile death penalty example showed, the Supreme Court might want to look
at German law for relevant facts (whether Germany believes that the juvenile
death penalty deters), including "moral facts" (whether Germans believe that
the juvenile death penalty is immoral).
One should not take the requirement of private information too literally.
The deterrent effect of the juvenile death penalty in Germany is in some sense
public, given that the German legislature must base its decision on an
assessment of facts that must be widely available within Germany. The point is
rather that an American court will often be able to determine these facts more
cheaply and reliably by consulting German law than by doing its own research
about the facts on which German law is based. When this is not the case, of
course, then the argument for consulting foreign law is much weaker. If the
U.S. court has direct and unmediated access to the facts, it should consult the
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facts, rather than another nation's attitude about the facts. The same point holds
in the domestic context. If a New York court seeks to know whether a certain
policy has a certain effect, it might investigate that issue directly, rather than
asking what most states believe the effects to be. But a New York court might
not be in a good position to investigate the issue rather than the belief. We will
return to this question-whether it is better to consult foreign law or the facts or
attitudes that it reflects-in a later section.
A further point is that a foreign law will often be consistent with multiple
factual conditions, and this weakens its value as a "vote." The absence of the
juvenile death penalty may be the result of "pure" moral convictions, not a
local assessment about its lack of deterrent effect. If so, an American court
interested in learning about the deterrent effect of the juvenile death penalty
will learn nothing from German law-and, indeed, may not even know whether
German law reflects moral considerations or information about deterrence. Or
suppose that Germans oppose the juvenile death penalty not because of moral
convictions (that is, private information about what we are treating as moral
facts) and not because of private information about its deterrent effect, but
simply because they find the juvenile death penalty distasteful. The lack of the
death penalty, then, just tells us that Germans find it distasteful. If most other
countries also lack the death penalty, the Jury Theorem might just tell us that
most people find the death penalty distasteful. This is not likely to be relevant
to American adjudication.
This latter problem leads to our second inquiry, which is whether the state
is "sincere." In the standard application of the Jury Theorem, sincerity means
that the voter's vote is based on her private information, and that she does not
vote "strategically," in order to obtain some other end. As an example, consider
the application of the Jury Theorem to an ordinary jury. A juror votes sincerely
if her vote reflects her assessment about the defendant's guilt. A juror votes
insincerely if her vote reflects some other purpose-for example, to ensure that
deliberations end quickly, or to impress other jurors, or to show other jurors
that she has an independent mind.
In our setting, the sincerity requirement can be understood as the
requirement that the state's political system produces laws (or its legal system
produces judicial decisions) that accurately reflect "private" facts or values. 56
Here, the question is whether the foreign government enacted the law in
question (or failed to repeal it) because of the relevant private information or
because of political dynamics of no concern to the American court. Suppose
that Germany lacks the juvenile death penalty because of the disproportionate
influence of an interest group, one that does not much care about the relevant
facts or moral principles. The influence of the interest group muddies the
informational value of the vote. It may be that the interest group would not be
56. We will put aside one way of being insincere-mimicking other states for ulterior
reasons-because we address this under the heading of independence.
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able to effect the repeal if Germans believe strongly that the juvenile death
penalty is justified on moral or deterrence grounds; but since the American
judge cannot determine the extent of the interest group's influence, it cannot
measure the quality of the information on the basis of which Germans resist its
pressure or not.
States are not people and some may find it odd to label a state law as
"sincere" or not. What is important is not sincerity in the psychological sense
but whether the laws of other states, including judicial decisions, reflect a
political or legal process that incorporates information that is private to the
state-in the sense that government officials have that information as a result of
their own research, their own local knowledge, or their ability to aggregate the
information, judgments, and values of the mass of citizens. Political and legal
systems may be defective in various ways. The laws might reflect the choices
of a tiny ruling elite; so might the judicial opinions. In these cases, it would be
wise for the American court to ignore or discount the law of the other state.
Il1 THE SIMILARITY CONDITION
The similarity condition is both straightforward and important, but easily
misunderstood. It says that the foreign law provides relevant information-it is
a "vote" on the relevant question-only if the foreign country is sufficiently
similar in the right way to the United States. All countries are different from all
other countries, and the laws of countries that are similar in many ways may
nonetheless diverge considerably because the two countries are dissimilar in
some crucial way. The relevant question is not whether the United States and
some other country like Germany are similar in some general or abstract sense;
the question is whether a German law or judicial opinion might offer relevant
information for an American court addressing a factual, moral, or institutional
problem that is similar in Germany and the United States.
Indeed, in many cases dissimilarity will be affirmatively desirable, for
purposes of using the Jury Theorem, as long as the dimensions along which
other countries differ from the United States are not correlated. Suppose, for
example, that all states (except the United States) ban the juvenile death
penalty. If all the other states were identical, we might be worried that the ban
reflected some invisible institutional aspect of these other countries rather than
a robust moral conviction. Suppose, now, that the countries all have different
moral and legal traditions, and that some countries have serious juvenile crime
and others not, and so forth. The fact that such different nations all ban the
juvenile death penalty might indicate that the death penalty violates universal
moral norms, or that the juvenile death penalty is ineffective because of
universal characteristics of the problem (for example, that juveniles discount
the future more than adults do, and thus cannot be deterred). However, we will
put aside this consideration and focus on how courts can determine whether the
similarity condition is met.
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A. Factual Differences
Suppose that a factual question is at issue: will a certain practice create
unemployment effects? Perhaps a practice will have such effects in one state,
with its distinctive mix of employers, even though it does not have such effects
in other states, with their very different mix of employers. We started with the
example of Texas trying to determine whether a public policy exception to
employment at will would have an adverse effect on the employment market
and looking at the law of other American states in order to find an answer. Is
there any reason why Texas should not also look at the law in France or the
United Kingdom?
One reason not to do this is that France is more different from Texas than,
say, Vermont is. But many of the differences, including many of the most
dramatic differences, are immaterial. For example, the fact that French is
spoken in France, and English is spoken in Texas and Vermont, is not relevant.
The fact that France has more generous employment benefits, so that high
unemployment may be more willingly tolerated in France than in Texas or
Vermont, is relevant. So in this case, it might be unwise for Texas to place
weight on French law.
Consider again the juvenile death penalty. The absence of such a law in a
nation like Switzerland, where there is very little violent crime among
juveniles, may provide little information; perhaps Switzerland has never had to
confront the question of whether to have a juvenile death penalty because no
one thinks there is a juvenile crime problem. But suppose that Russia has a
serious problem of violent juvenile crime, a death penalty for adults, but no
juvenile death penalty. Even though Russia is a very different country, the
absence of the juvenile death penalty there might tell an American court that
the Russians have concluded that such a law would not have a significant
deterrent effect.
Now the Russian experience may be further distinguishable-perhaps
juveniles there do not have access to guns to the same degree as in the United
States-but these differences can also be taken into account. The differences
between Russia and Texas, on the one hand, and between Vermont and Texas,
on the other, are a matter of degree, not of kind.57
B. Moral Differences
1. Prerequisites
The relevance of the Jury Theorem when moral judgments are at issue is
more complex, and depends on a number of conditions. First, one must reject
57. For evidence that the U.S. Supreme Court has relied on foreign law to resolve
factual questions, see Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 4, at 903-05 (citing abortion,
euthanasia, and Miranda cases).
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any strong form of cultural relativism, according to which the appropriate
moral rules are culture dependent, so that the moral requirements that are
suitable for one culture need not be suitable for another culture. If a court
subscribes to this strong form of cultural relativism, then it should not consult
foreign law for information about what morality requires. In Jury Theorem
terms, a foreign country's rejection of some practice on moral grounds provides
no information about whether this practice is morally acceptable in the United
States. We believe that strong forms of cultural relativism are difficult to
sustain, 58 and hence this objection may be safely ignored; but for those who are
committed to cultural relativism, consultation of comparative law will make
little sense.
It is possible that some opposition to such consultation depends on a form
of cultural relativism or, perhaps more interestingly, a form of cultural
relativism with respect to law in general or constitutional law in particular. It is
here that different approaches to constitutional interpretation might lead to
different judgments about comparative law; and hence opposition to use of
foreign law5 might be brought in close contact with the Condorcet Jury
Theorem. On one understanding of originalism, for example, the practices of
other nations are generally irrelevant, because the interpretive goal is to recover
the original understanding of the relevant provision, and on the original
understanding, the constitutional issue must be resolved without reference to
those practices. 60 On this view, constitutional law is culturally relative even if
morality is not; perhaps the meaning of the founding document does not depend
on what other nations do. When the U.S. Supreme Court is deciding on the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, perhaps it is not making anything like
a moral inquiry into the requirements of equality, and perhaps the information
that comes from the practices of other nations is almost never relevant.
If this position is accepted, of course, a degree of cultural relativism is
appropriate in the domain of constitutional law. On this view, American states
properly consult the practices of other states, certainly in making common law
decisions and perhaps more generally; 61 but the U.S. Supreme Court ought
rarely, if ever, to consult the practices of other nations. When some nations
consult comparative law, it is because their own interpretive practices justify
the consultation; there is no reason to think that every nation must follow the
same such practices.62 Under the constitutional approach in South Africa, for
58. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHIcs 20-26 (1972).
59. See Gonzales, supra note 29.
60. See id.; Scalia & Breyer, supra note 43.
61. In state constitutional law, the question would depend on whether originalism is
the appropriate method. If the meaning of the Constitution of Montana turns on the original
understanding in Montana, or if it otherwise depends on norms and principles specific to
Montana, the practices of other states are irrelevant, subject to the provisos in note 34, supra.
62. Note, however, that the Jury Theorem might itself operate at the meta-level, in
helping nations select among theories of interpretation, at least in the face of reasonable
[Vol. 59:131
THE LAW OF OTHER STA TES
example, the constitutionality of certain laws legitimately turns, in part, on the
views of other nations; 63 and here the Condorcet Jury Theorem helps to explain
why. The United States might be different; whether it is depends on a judgment
about the right theory of constitutional interpretation.
64
Second, and related, one must probably reject any moral theory that holds
that the legally relevant moral judgments are best understood as a product of a
nation's distinctive traditions and history-at least if the theory does not always
acknowledge that the lessons of a particular history can be universal. If
Germany rejects the death penalty Simply because of its Nazi past, for example,
and if that rejection does not offer a general moral lesson, this rejection has
little informational value for the United States. Perhaps Germany's judgment is
a product of the nationally specific associations of the death penalty, in a way
that has no implications for other nations. Third, one must, of course, reject any
skeptical moral theory that holds that morality is just a matter of personal
preferences, or that moral rules are sufficiently obvious that research does not
shed light on them-one just consults one's own conscience.
2. Moral practices and moral contenders
Mainstream philosophical theories reject strong forms of skepticism and
relativism, 65 and thus provide a reasonable foundation for courts to consult
foreign materials in order to determine moral rules, where legal decisions are
legitimately based in whole or in part on moral judgments. Here we shall focus
on those judgments, assuming for purposes of analysis that they bear on the
proper resolution of a legal controversy.
It is possible that legal actors should reason from the moral judgments of
other nations without asking anything about the foundations of those
judgments. Consider, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 66 The emergence of the Universal Declaration involved something
closely akin to what we are describing here: an effort to root legal norms in an
understanding of the independent judgments of relevant nations. 67 Indeed the
doubt. If the vast majority of nations consult the practices of other nations, then any
particular nation might do so for that reason, assuming that the three conditions are met. It
will be noticed that our own argument for attending to comparative law is informed by the
fact that this practice is widely endorsed.
63. See Markesinis & Fedtke, supra note 21, at 48-55.
64. Note again that the Jury Theorem might help in selecting that approach. If every
nation in the world rejected originalism, the argument for originalism would surely be
weakened. See supra note 62.
65. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18-19, 42-45 (revised ed. 1999)
(discussing the search for reflective equilibrium); WILLIAMS, supra note 58, at 20-26.
66. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/
rights.html.
67. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE ANEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
October 2006]
STANFORD LA WREVIEW
process had a powerful if implicit Condorcetian feature, involving as it did an
inquiry into the practices of all or most. The basic enterprise operated by
surveying the behavior of most nations, and by building a "universal
declaration" on the basis of shared practices. A philosophers' group, involved
in the project, "began its work ... by sending a questionnaire to statesmen and
scholars around the world.",68 At a key stage, those involved in drafting the
declaration produced "a list of forty-eight items that represented . . . the
common core of' a wide range of documents and proposals, including
judgments from "Arabic, British, Canadian, Chinese, French, pre-Nazi German,
Italian, Indian, Latin American, Polish, Soviet Russian and Spanish" nations
and cultures. 6 9 Jacques Maritain, a philosopher closely involved in the
Universal Declaration, famously said, "Yes, we agree about the rights but on
condition no one asks us why." 70 Hence a judgment in favor of a set of rights
can emerge across disagreement or uncertainty about the foundations of those
rights. Law rarely requires deep engagement with high-level moral disputes;
legal controversies can thereby be resolved with less ambitious judgments,
even those with a moral component.
7 1
Suppose, for example, that the Supreme Court of Idaho is deciding whether
the free speech provision of its Constitution protects commercial advertising.
Idaho might notice that the overwhelming majority of states have concluded
that their state constitutions do, in fact, protect commercial advertising. If so,
the Supreme Court of Idaho might rule in favor of commercial advertising,
without making any particularly ambitious claims about the foundations of
constitutional law or even of the free speech principle. The examples could
easily be multiplied.
It is also possible, however, to see how the Jury Theorem might be relevant
for the two main high-level moral contenders: utilitarian or welfarist
approaches,72 on the one hand, and deontological approaches on the other. As
before, we are assuming that one or the other approach is relevant to the
interpretation of the relevant legal materials.
A welfarist court would think that when the law is ambiguous, it should
interpret the law so as to maximize social welfare. 73 On this view, a vague
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001).
68. Id. at51.
69. Id. at 57.
70. Id. at 77.
71. See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995) (discussing the ways that law depends on the existence of
agreement among people who differ on foundational issues or do not know what they think
about such issues).
72. Utilitarianism is a species of welfarism and should not be identified with it. It is
possible to believe that what matters is people's welfare, without also believing that welfare
should be measured in utilitarian terms. For a relevant discussion, see Amartya Sen,
Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL. 463 (1979).
73. For an argument in this vein, see RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT (2006).
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constitutional provision such as the Eighth Amendment must be given some
welfarist content. If the court believes that foreign courts and legislatures also
care about maximizing welfare (though this need not be their exclusive
concern), then the court can take foreign legal materials as evidence about what
these foreign institutions believe are the rules that maximize welfare. Near-
universal rejection of the juvenile death penalty provides evidence, on this
view, that nearly every decision-maker who has considered the question
believes that the deterrent effect of the rule is small or nil, and that any
deterrence benefits are outweighed by the costs (administrative, the welfare
cost to the executed criminal and the criminal's family, and so forth).
A court could similarly believe that it should interpret ambiguous laws in a
manner that respects rights, which qualify as such on the basis of a
deontological account. Some theories of rights hold that rights are universal; if
so, perhaps the same set of rights will be respected in most nations in which
people can freely debate and openly.74 Of course, distortions will occur; there
can be no assurance that free debate will lead to the proper account of rights.
But on the Condorcetian view, we might suppose that if most or all liberal
democracies ban the juvenile death penalty, it is reasonable to infer that the
death penalty would be rejected on the proper account of rights. (This may be
the account that would be chosen by people behind the veil of ignorance, in
Rawls's terms,75 or in an ideal speech situation, in Habermas's terms. 76) Here,
the frequency with which the penalty is rejected gives one confidence that the
rejection is not based on local or particular moral intuitions but reflects
universal moral convictions, and hence the right understanding of human rights.
As long as the societies allow free debate, the very fact that very different
societies come to the same conclusions increases one's confidence that the
norms are genuinely universal and transcend merely historical or institutional
differences. 77 Here is a way, noted above, that differences, rather than
similarities, among societies strengthen the case for consulting foreign
materials. Recall in this regard that agreement on outcomes, across
disagreement or uncertainty about foundational questions, may itself fortify the
argument for consulting the law of other states. If the overwhelming majority
of states agree that there is a right to free speech, and also agree on a particular
entailment of that right, we have some reason for confidence in their view, at
least if it is supposed that all or most are at least 50% likely to be right. We
have seen that the Universal Declaration of Rights can be understood in these
terms, and so too for many international agreements about the appropriate
content of rights or about proper social practices.
74. Jirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: An Author's Reflections, 76 DENV.
U. L. REv. 937, 940-41 (1999).
75. See RAwLs, supra note 65.
76. See Habermas, supra note 74.
77. Again a point of this sort played a key role in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. See GLENDON, supra note 67, at 77-78.
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Consider, for example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR),78 a treaty that refines and establishes as law many of the civil
and political rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Many of the
rights recognized by the ICCPR are ones that Americans take for granted,
including prohibitions on slavery (article 8), arbitrary arrest (article 9), freedom
of movement (article 12), and freedom of conscience (article 18). But for many
countries emerging from authoritarian regimes in the 1980s and 1990s, the fact
that this treaty existed, and reflected the judgments of numerous diverse
countries, must have provided good reason for believing that the rights
recognized in the treaty ought to be respected in their countries as well.
By contrast, most states have refused to ratify the second optional protocol
to the ICCPR, which bans the death penalty.79 This refusal shows that
judgments about the effectiveness or desirability of the death penalty are more
diverse, and that therefore a state deciding whether to eliminate the death
penalty may learn relatively little from the judgments of other states. 80
3. What's relative?
Morality may or may not be relative. But the right answer to a legal
question with moral components will often vary from one state to another.
Suppose, for example, that Georgia has no doctrine of "substantive due
process," whereas most states do have that doctrine. Georgia would not do well
to borrow the practices of the states with such a doctrine. The reason is that any
underlying moral judgment, relevant in states with a doctrine of substantive due
process, is immaterial in Georgia.
This last point is potentially general, in a way that raises difficulties for use
of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to justify reference to the views of other states
(understanding that word to include nations). Suppose that all states have
constitutional provisions that provide some sort of guarantee of "equality under
the law." It is nonetheless possible that any particular state has a distinctive or
even unique approach to that guarantee. We might imagine that the vast
majority of states do not believe that bans on same-sex marriage violate the
Equal Protection Clause. But perhaps one state, or a few states, understand their
equal protection clause in an unusually expansive way, and that this
understanding fits with the state's traditions. If so, the state (call it
78. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
79. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/44/128/Annex (Dec. 15, 1989).
80. As of September 2006, 157 states had ratified the ICCPR; only 57 had ratified the
second optional protocol. The status of ratifications for the ICCPR is available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm. The status of ratifications for the
optional protocol is available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/12.htm.
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Massachusetts 8 1) legitimately rejects the judgments of other states. The broader
point is that one does not have to be any kind of moral skeptic or relativist to
think that insofar as they are properly translated into law, some moral norms
are state specific. In such cases, courts that are required to draw on the relevant
local moral norms in order to interpret the law may be justified in ignoring
conflicting norms in other states. This claim is a generalization of the
suggestion that on some theories of constitutional interpretation, the practices
of other states are usually irrelevant.
C. Legal and Institutional Differences
Legal and institutional differences also matter. The stock example in the
literature is Justice Breyer's reliance on German law in making arguments
about the meaning of American federalism. 82 German federalism allows the
German states to enforce national law; so why not in America? The question
may make sense if the practice of Germany is informative on some question of
relevance to American law. The problem with the argument is that in Germany,
the states play a far greater role in creating national law than American states
do, and this institutional difference may well make German law uninformative
on the questions that concern Americans.
8 3
The point is, again, that differences matter when they are large and
relevant, and not when they are small or irrelevant. Justice Breyer meant to
suggest that the German practice helps to show what the American practice
ought to be or might legitimately or reasonably be; perhaps he erred in ignoring
institutional differences between the two systems. Justice Breyer might
therefore have been wrong to rely on German institutions. Note, however, that
even under current practice it is quite common to appeal to British laws and
institutions notwithstanding the fact that the British parliamentary system is
more different from the American system than the various presidential systems
in Latin America and elsewhere that are indeed modeled on the American
system. Consider this remark of Justice Scalia:
I don't use British law for everything. I use British law for those elements of
the Constitution that were taken from Britain. The phrase "the right to be
confronted with witnesses against him"-what did confrontation consist of in
England? It had a meaning to the American colonists, all of whom were
intimately familiar with my friend Blackstone. And what they understood
when they ratified this Constitution was that they were affirming the rights of
Englishmen. So to know what the Constitution meant at the time, you have to
81. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
82. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83. See Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering,
in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 213, 249-51 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001).
For a discussion of this problem, see Tushnet, Knowing Less, supra note 4, at 1295.
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know what English law was at the time. And that isn't so for every provision
of the Constitution.
84
On originalist grounds, Justice Scalia's assumption that the criminal
defendant's confrontation right had the same understanding in the United States
as in Britain is plausible, and his reliance on British law is therefore
reasonable. 8 5 But note that the implicit assumption here is that eighteenth-
century Americans believed that the confrontation right should exist in America
as it did in Britain, despite the enormous institutional differences between the
two countries. Britain was a constitutional monarchy and America a quasi-
democratic republic. One could imagine someone arguing in the eighteenth
century (or today) that because the United States was a democratic country, it
did not need to grant as generous protections to criminal defendants as Britain
did, for politically motivated prosecutions would be punished at the polls (as
they indeed were in the election of 180086). If this argument is correct, the
confrontation right in the United States should be understood more narrowly
than the confrontation right in Britain. The contrary view, which prevailed, is
that politically motivated or otherwise unfair prosecutions could be a serious
problem in a democracy as well as in a monarchy.
Thus, for some purposes large institutional differences do not matter. An
obvious example involves the question of whether the executive can use
military force without a congressional declaration of war. From one view, the
American Constitution should be understood with close reference to British
practice, where the executive did not need legislative approval.87 But from
another view, the British practice is irrelevant because a republic rests on
different principles.
88
Consider again the juvenile death penalty. Is it relevant that it was
abolished in countries with different political systems? One reason that it might
be irrelevant is if we think that those political systems do not aggregate values
and information well; but this seems highly unlikely, at least as a claim about
the extremely wide range of systems that have abolished the death penalty.
Another reason that it might be irrelevant is if we adopt a particular
understanding of constitutional interpretation, in accordance with which the
84. See Scalia & Breyer, supra note 43.
85. Compare this with John Yoo's reliance on British practice in attempting to
understand the allocation of authority between the President and the Congress for purposes
of making war. See JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005) (discussing the constitutional origins of the President's
war powers).
86. JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 431-32 (1956).
87. See YOO, supra note 85.
88. See, e.g., James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 433-
34 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 94-95
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987); Pierce Butler, Remarks in the South Carolina
Legislature (Jan. 16, 1788), reprinted in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra, at 94.
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Eighth Amendment contains a fixed category of prohibitions, or a category of
prohibitions that, if not fixed, evolves with changing values and practices in the
United States alone. It is certainly possible to think that what counts as "cruel
and unusual" is a function of the views of Americans, not of the world as a
whole. If so, consultation of the practices of other nations is a blunder because
those practices do not bear on the proper interpretation of the American
Constitution. We have seen that originalists so believe.89 If correct, the same
idea applies to many imaginable uses of comparative materials by federal
courts; and so too, the same idea might be turned into an objection to
consultation, by one state, of the practices of other states.
The public policy question faced by the Texas court can be evaluated in a
broadly similar way. Suppose that some foreign court also has a public policy
exception to employment at will. Relevant considerations would include (1)
whether the foreign employment market is relatively free or relatively
constrained in other ways; (2) whether the foreign court is as capable as
American courts in addressing these issues; and (3) whether the foreign country
has other institutions for resolving employment disputes (such as pervasive
unionization). For the Texas decision, however, it is unlikely that comparative
practices would be deemed relevant, given the existing sources of law. The
question is how informative those practices are on the particular question that
concerns Texas.
The upshot is that whether legal and institutional differences matter
depends on context, and there is no reason to treat legal and institutional
rquestions as different from factual and moral questions.
D. The Regression Approach
One objection to the argument so far, which we call the regression
problem, is not an objection to comparative constitutionalism per se, but to the
method advocated by its supporters, which might seem excessively crude. If we
want information, then the right way to obtain information is to perform
regressions that control for differences among states, not to pick and choose
among the states and take those that seem similar in some ill-defined way,
while ignoring those that seem different. To be sure, it would be exceedingly
difficult for courts to perform regressions, a point to which we will return. For
the moment we are trying to specify the right analysis and to bracket the
question of whether judges can engage in that analysis.
Suppose that an American court wants to know whether the juvenile death
penalty deters juvenile crime. A social scientist would answer this question by
collecting data from different countries. The dependent variable would be, say,
the juvenile crime rate. The main independent variable is whether a state has
the juvenile death penalty or not. Other independent variables would attempt to
89. See Gonzales, supra note 29; Scalia & Breyer, supra note 43.
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control for factors that may affect the juvenile crime rate independently of the
existence of the death penalty for juveniles: whether guns are available,
whether the population is homogenous or ethnically mixed, whether there are
great wealth differentials, whether the criminal justice system is effective or
not, and so forth. These control variables would ensure (or try to ensure) that
any relationship between the juvenile crime rate and the juvenile death penalty
reflects the causal influence of the latter, and not some other factor that is
partially correlated with the penalty. The court should perform the regression
and then conclude that the juvenile death penalty has a deterrent effect if and
only if the regression reveals such an effect.
90
Regressions are not always possible, however. To see why, imagine that all
states (except the United States) reject the juvenile death penalty. A regression
will not reveal information about the deterrent effect of the juvenile death
penalty because of a lack of cross-state variation. Nonetheless, the rejection by
all states of the juvenile death penalty may be informative: it may reveal that
the government of each state believes that the juvenile death penalty is
immoral, ineffectual, or otherwise unacceptable for its citizens.
There are other ways to collect relevant information. One could conduct
surveys asking people which punishment is crueler; one could consult doctors
and other experts. All of this might be useful information and in some settings
courts should perhaps take advantage of it. But the benefit of relying on foreign
law, rather than regression results based on foreign data, is that the law itself, in
the right conditions, already embodies the regression results in the sense that
legislatures use their knowledge of local conditions in order to decide whether
or not to implement the law. If American courts and experts have access to all
the data in all countries, then the regression approach is the proper one. But if,
as must be the usual case, American courts and experts do not have access to all
data in all countries-because cultural differences and logistical problems
make data collection and interpretation impossible-then foreign states' laws
and policies are the best evidence of what the underlying data say, and the Jury
Theorem is properly applied. Comparative law, then, is a shortcut that allows
American courts to aggregate information through intermediaries such as
national legislatures and courts.
E. Are Only Liberal Democracies Relevant?
One might think that American courts should consult the legal materials
only of liberal democracies. There may be reasons of administrative cost for
limiting the field in this way, a point to which we will retum.91 And on
Condorcetian grounds, democracies seem to deserve special attention, on the
90. In this particular example, the regression would be uninformative because so few
states have the juvenile death penalty.
91. See infra Part VI.
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theory that regarding facts and morality, they are more than 50% likely to be
right, as nondemocracies may not be. It may well be that democracies, because
they are democratic, are more likely to incorporate information about what is
true. Suppose, by contrast, that the relevant nations are dictatorships, inclined
to oppress their people. Perhaps we will believe that the practices of
dictatorships are less than 50% likely to be right. There may be an analogue at
the domestic level; perhaps some states legitimately distrust most states on
certain issues. But as a matter of principle, the argument for restricting
consultation to liberal democracies seems vulnerable, at least in its crudest
form.
First, many countries that are not liberal democracies nonetheless have
some good laws and institutions. There is no reason to think that a
nondemocracy enacts only bad laws; the leaders of most nondemocracies want
the public to be satisfied as long as they can accomplish this goal without
undermining their own ends. Indeed, much ordinary law--criminal law,
contract law, and so forth-is relatively constant across both democracies and
nondemocracies. For the purpose of comparative constitutionalism, relying on
foreign legal materials is not meant to express approval of all aspects of the
foreign country. Rather, it is simply a way of taking advantage of unexploited
mines of information.
Second, the very fact that nondemocratic nations recognize a particular
norm may show that the norm is exceptionally strong. For example, we are
accustomed to think that nondemocracies are less tolerant of crime than
democracies, and therefore have stricter criminal penalties. Thus, critics of the
juvenile death penalty have frequently cited the fact that the vast majority of
authoritarian states do not execute juveniles as powerful evidence that the
penalty violates a significant norm-a norm so significant that even crime-
obsessed authoritarian states cannot ignore it.
As a general matter, however, it is true that democracies are a more reliable
source of information about facts and norms, simply because democratic
governments are more tightly constrained by public opinions and values.
Political competition gives parties an incentive to gauge popular attitudes, and
itself generates information when elections reveal that a particular program is
not as popular as one might have thought.92 But this is a matter of degree, and
there is no reason in principle to doubt that successful authoritarian
governments maintain power by catering to the interests of the public to some
degree. 93 It follows that an ideal exercise in comparative constitutionalism
92. Cf GOODIN, supra note 28, at 108.
93. An inconclusive literature exists that debates whether dictators who seek to
maximize their power would choose laws that the public desires, except where they directly
interfere with the dictator's monopoly on power (for example, electoral laws), or would
choose laws that are frequently undesirable. Compare Casey B. Mulligan et al., Do
Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter
2004, at 51 (taking the former view), with MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY:
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would survey all countries-democracies and nondemocracies alike-and
place more weight on the legal materials of democracies than on those of
nondemocracies without neglecting the latter. However, it will often be more
realistic to limit oneself to a small number of countries, in which case one
should focus on democracies as they probably provide more reliable
information.
IV. THE INDEPENDENCE CONDITION AND CASCADES
The independence condition says that the decision of each state to adopt or
reject a particular law must be independent (at least partially so) from the
decisions of other states. As this condition is more complicated than the others,
and as its violation can lead to some especially interesting results, we will go
into more detail here.
The reason that independence is an important condition is that voters who
have exactly the same information or views, or simply mimic other voters, do
not, by agreeing on whether the outcome is good or bad, provide additional
information about the sense or value of the outcome. Suppose, for example,
that former colonies of the United Kingdom adopted certain British laws and
institutions just because they were British, and not because the former colonies
had made an independent judgment that those laws and institutions served their
interests. We might imagine that some newly independent states adopted those
laws and institutions because they did not have the time and resources to study
the legal systems of other states and maintaining existing laws and institutions
reduced transition costs.94 In this case, the existence of identical British-derived
legal rules in dozens of states provides no more information about the value of
the rules than it would if they existed in only one state-Britain itself.
The violation of the independence condition can have an interesting effect
known as a cascade. When cascades occur, there is far less reason to trust the
judgments of many voters, or states, because the particular judgments of many
or most do not add information. If one hundred voters say something, but
ninety-seven are participants in a cascade, there is little reason to trust their
statement. Hence it is not the case that the probability of a correct judgment by
a large number of states is high, simply because many of those states are not
offering useful information.
OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS 111-34 (2000) (taking the latter
view). For a discussion, see THR.INN EGGERTSSON, IMPERFECT INSTITUTIONS: POSSIBILITIES
AND LIMITS OF REFORM 60-62 (2005). Common sense suggests that, at least sometimes,
dictators choose popular policies in order to maximize their support, but that democracies are
more likely to choose policies that serve the public interest.
94. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(2d ed. 1993). As Watson shows, some countries carefully studied the legal systems of other
states before reforming their own; others did not.
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There are two kinds of cascades: informational 95 and reputational. 96 Both
kinds can occur across states as well as across individuals. To see how an
informational cascade works, suppose that an urn contains seventy red chips
and thirty black chips. One hundred people take turns taking a chip from the
urn at random, examine it privately, and return it to the urn. Each person must,
in sequence, announce whether he thinks that the urn contains more red chips
or more black chips. Everyone who guesses correctly receives a prize. The first
person will rationally guess that the urn contains more red chips if the chip he
selected is red, and that the urn contains more black chips if the chip he
selected is black. The second person, in making his guess, will rationally take
account both of the first person's public guess and of the color of his own chip.
For example, if the first person said "red," the second person has reason to
believe that the first chip was red. If the second person's chip is also red, he
will guess red; if it's black he might guess red or black (at random). The third
person will similarly take account of the public guesses of the first and second
person as well as of the color of his own chip.
Four points should be made about this example. First, the majority of the
group would almost certainly make the right guess if each person stated his
own guess in isolation, unaffected by the judgments of those who came before.
Second, people benefit each other by announcing their decision; in doing so,
they disclose information about the number of red and black chips in the urn.
Third, it is rational for everyone to take account of the public guess of prior
speakers: one is more likely to guess correctly if one takes account of prior
guesses than if one takes account only of the color of one's own chip, as long
as the prior guesses are honest statements about the color of the chip that was
drawn. Fourth, people are less likely to guess right than they would if they were
informed of the color of the chips chosen by those who preceded them as well
as that person's guess.
This last point raises a serious problem. As more people guess, subsequent
participants will place more weight on the prior guesses than on their own chip,
and eventually people will simply repeat what was said before. A possible
result is an informational cascade: the first three players might draw and
therefore announce black, and then everyone will announce black, even though
70% of the actual draws are red.
It is easy to create erroneous cascades in the laboratory. The simplest
experiment asked subjects to guess whether the experiment was using Urn A,
which contained two red balls and one white, or Urn B, which contained two
white balls and one red.97 The point of the experiment was to see whether
95. See, e.g., Bikhchandani et al., supra note 51 (exploring the nature of informational
cascades).
96. See Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational
Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 623 (1998).
97. See Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory,
87 AM. ECON. REv. 847 (1997).
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people will decide to ignore their own draw in the face of conflicting
announcements by predecessors-and to explore whether such decisions will
lead to cascades and errors. Cascades often developed, and they often produced
errors. Over 77% of "rounds" resulted in cascades, and 15% of private
announcements did not reveal a "private signal," that is, the information
provided by people's own draw. Here is an actual example of a cascade
producing an entertainingly inaccurate outcome (the urn used was B): 98
Table 1. An Informational Cascade
1 2 3 4 5 6
Private draw red red white white white white
Decision A A A A A A
There is a clear analogue at the level of states, both domestically and
internationally. If two states have adopted a law, or if two state courts have
made some innovation, a third may do so, not because of any kind of
independent judgment, but because it is following its predecessors. And if three
states have made the same decision, a cascade might be forming. The problem
is that subsequent states might assume that decisions have been made
independently, even though most have been following the crowd.99
In a reputational cascade, people think that they know what is right, or
what is likely to be right, but they nonetheless go along with the crowd in order
to maintain the good opinion of others. Suppose that Albert suggests that global
warming is a serious problem and that Barbara concurs with Albert, not
because she actually thinks that Albert is right, but because she does not wish
to seem, to Albert, to be ignorant or indifferent to environmental protection. If
Albert and Barbara seem to agree that global warming is a serious problem,
Cynthia might not contradict them publicly and might even appear to share
their judgment, not because she believes that judgment to be correct, but
because she does not want to face their hostility or lose their good opinion. It
should be easy to see how this process might generate a cascade. Once Albert,
Barbara, and Cynthia offer a united front on the issue, their friend David might
bd reluctant to contradict them even if he thinks that they are wrong. The
apparent views of Albert, Barbara, and Cynthia carry information; that apparent
view might be right. But even if David thinks that they are wrong and has
information supporting that conclusion, he might not want to take them on
98. See Marc Willinger & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, Are More Informed Agents Able to
Shatter Information Cascades in the Lab?, in THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORKS: INTERACTION
AND BEHAVIOURS 291 (Patrick Cohendet et al. eds., 1998).
99. For a discussion in the context of court of appeals decisions, see Andrew F.
Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and
Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 158 (1999).
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publicly. The problem, of course, is that the group will not hear what David
knows.
The same problem emerges at the level of states. Some states follow others,
not because of private information, but because of reputational pressures.
Suppose, for example, that a number of states have adopted some version of
Megan's Law-a statute requiring registration of sex offenders.' 0 0 Additional
states might follow the first group, not because they believe the statute is a
good idea, but because its supporters are able to impose reputational pressure
by virtue of the practice of prior states. When this is so, the decisions of those
in a cascade fail to provide additional information.
The cascade model provides an important warning about using the
Condorcet Jury Theorem to justify reliance on the view of a majority of states.
Suppose that the law of all states is identical, all states chose their law as an act
of judgment (condition 1), and all states are similar along the relevant
dimensions (condition 2). Nonetheless, the fact that all states have the same law
is no more informative than if only one or two states had the same law if it
turns out that later states imitated earlier states-as they should, under our
analysis! In this sense, use of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to justify reference
to the law of other states turns out to be self-defeating; it undermines its own
precondition.
This odd implication should not, however, be taken too seriously. It would
be true only if a relevant number of states did in fact merely imitate and fail to
make independent judgments. They might sometimes, especially in the
important but narrow case where new states adopt or inherit wholesale foreign
legal systems, which is known as legal transplant.' 0' In this case, and possible
other cases where the evidence suggests that a law was adopted out of imitation
and not as a result (at least partially) of independent judgment, an American
court should discount the law of another state. But in the usual case, states
imitate laws and policies of other states only after going through a process of
deliberation, one that takes account of local conditions and differences between
the earlier adopters and the state in question. In this case, the "vote" is only
partially dependent, and thus reveals some information about the general
desirability of the laws and policies at issue.
A further implication is that a state that ignores the decisions of the other
states and instead makes a decision based on its own "draw" confers a positive
externality on other states by revealing information-information from which
later decision-makers would benefit. The private incentive is to herd, but the
public-spirited thing to do is to decide on the basis of one's own information, at
least in many circumstances. Thus, the cosmopolitan-the person who believes
100. See Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Sex Offenders; Justices Reject
Challenges to Megan's Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at A29 (discussing legal challenges
to Megan's Law).
101. See WATSON, supra note 94.
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that national boundaries are morally arbitrary and that people owe moral
obligations to foreigners to the same extent as to fellow citizens 12--ought to
prefer states not to imitate other states, or at least not to imitate other states as
often as a state would if it consulted only its private interest.
This last point bears emphasis. If our conditions are met, it is rational for a
state to imitate other states, but it may not be in the global interest for the state
to imitate other states. If our conditions are not met, it is neither privately
rational nor globally desirable for a state to imitate other states.
To complicate our analogy, we might distinguish between a state's public
decision (the "guess") and the reasons (if any) that it gives for its decision. In
our urn example, a public-spirited person would both announce the color of his
chip and make his guess (which would be partially based on the guesses, and
hence the chip colors, of the prior decision-makers). Subsequent decision-
makers would ignore the guess and pay attention only to the announcement of
the chip color. This would lead to the optimal result.
Similarly, public-spirited states ought to make their decision and announce
the reasons for their decision. For example, a state might announce that it
abolishes the juvenile death penalty because citizens do not believe that it
deters crime, because citizens think it is wrong to execute people for crimes
they committed as juveniles, or because it cannot join the European Union
unless it abolishes the juvenile death penalty. Another state might rationally
take account of the first state's decision only in the first case, and not in the
second or third. But all this depends on states giving a candid explanation for
their decision; we suspect that in many cases there is either no official
explanation, disagreement about the explanation, or (in the case of authoritarian
states) the true explanation and the official explanation are different. Note that
in some cases a state might delegate to academics, foreign service agents, or
others the duty to find out the real explanation. For example, one could
commission a statistical study to see whether abolishing the juvenile death
penalty has an effect on crime across countries. This returns us to our earlier
point that empirical studies might be helpful, but they must be more carefully
done than those that have appeared so far in the opinions of the Supreme Court.
V. FOREIGN LAW VERSUS INTERNATIONAL LAW
In Lawrence v. Texas,10 3 the Court justified its abandonment of Bowers v.
Hardwick 0 4 partly by reference to international materials: "To the extent
Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted
that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. The
102. See, e.g., Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229,
229-39 (1972).
103. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
104. 478 U.S. 186(1986).
[Vol. 59:131
THE LA W OF OTHER STA TES
European Court of Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision
in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom."' 
0 5
Bowers had upheld a law criminalizing homosexual sodomy; Lawrence
found that a similar law violated the Due Process Clause. In citing the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Lawrence did not cite "foreign
law," in the sense of a decision of a foreign national court interpreting a foreign
statute or constitution; it cited international law, in the sense of an international
court interpreting an international treaty.
International law is different from foreign law. International law is the law
that states create to govern their relations with each other. Foreign law, as used
in the literature, is the domestic law of foreign states. The literature has so far
not made much of these differences; where it has, most authors have treated
international law as deserving of the same consultation that foreign national
law deserves. 10 6 However, the differences between foreign law and
international law are important, and the case for relying on international law is
trickier than the case for relying on foreign law.
One puzzling question is whether the ECHR's application of a regional
convention ought to receive more or less weight than a national court's
application of a national constitution. Should the ECHR's application of the
European Convention on Human Rights to a particular set of facts receive more
weight than the application of, say, the German high court of German law or of
European law? Several factors are relevant. First, the ECHR has jurisdiction
over forty-five states, not just one. These forty-five states have agreed on the
underlying convention and on the authority of the ECHR to interpret it; and
therefore, the court's outcome may reflect the aggregate wisdom of a very large
population rather than a relatively small one. If this is so, there is a
Condorcetian reason to give special weight to the views of the ECHR.
However, there is no reason to count the treaty-or the decision of an
international court charged with interpreting the treaty-as an extra
Condorcetian vote beyond the votes of the forty-five states. On the most
optimistic account, the treaty and the decision simply reflect the aggregate
judgment of the forty-five states.
Second, one might worry that a treaty is less likely to reflect the
independent judgments of the states than national law does. Many parties to the
convention became parties in order to obtain the benefits of cooperation with
other European countries. These states may have entered the ECHR system
despite their doubts about particular rules or norms rather than because of
105. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.
106. For a survey of the literature, see Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman,
Editor's Introduction, Agora: The United States Constitution and International Law, 98 AM.
J. INT'L L. 42 (2004). For an important exception, which we will discuss below, see Michael
D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and
Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (2004).
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them. 10 7 If so, the ECHR's judgment may be worth less, or not much more,
than the judgment of a national court interpreting national law. 108
Third, the ECHR's judgment might be considered less valuable than that of
a clear treaty because the ECHR may not have the private information that the
separate governments have. Suppose, for example, that the ECHR's decision
was based on the views of the ECHR's judges about whether laws against
sodomy are likely to discourage unsafe sexual practices that spread disease, not
on clear treaty language. One might worry that these judges' views of the facts
reflect less private information about this question than the aggregate
information contained in the judgments of forty-five courts deciding
independently in forty-five countries. Something similar might be said if the
decision of the ECHR reflects judgments of morality rather than judgments of
fact.
Taken together, these factors suggest that a domestic court should not place
any weight on international treaties, except as the equivalent of a "vote" by
each of the parties. The European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted
by the ECHR, indicates that forty-five states reject criminalizing sodomy, and
nothing beyond that; or it might simply reflect one court's views about the risks
associated with sodomy. Further, because of the ambiguities surrounding the
states' motives for entering the treaty, one might want to count the ECHR
decision as something less than forty-five votes.
Another set of issues is raised by treaties that the United States has ratified.
Imagine that the U.S. government enacts a statute permitting American agents
to torture suspects in the war on terror, and a constitutional challenge has been
mounted. The U.S. court must decide whether torture violates the doctrine of
substantive due process. 10 9 In doing so, it might consult foreign materials on
Condorcetian grounds-including foreign legislation and judicial decisions
regarding torture. But should it consult the Convention Against Torture, which
107. Although the facts are disputed, the Council of Europe may have demanded that
Hungary abolish the death penalty in return for admission to the Council. See George P.
Fletcher, Searching for the Rule of Law in the Wake of Communism, 1992 BYU L. REV. 145,
159-60.
108. As another example, consider the Helsinki Accord of 1975, in which the West
recognized the Soviet sphere of influence in return for the Soviet Union's agreement to
respect basic human rights. The Soviet Union's signature did not reflect the leadership's
judgment that human rights are worthy of respect. The recognition was simply the price to be
paid for obtaining certain geopolitical goals, and indeed the Soviets did not intend to change
their behavior. The value of the agreement as information regarding what the Soviet Union
and its satellites thought about human rights was nil. See Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki
Accords and Political Change in Eastern Europe, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL NoRMs AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 205 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999).
109. For a discussion of this issue, see Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the
Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
278 (2003). As always it is possible to endorse a theory of constitutional interpretation that
makes the views of other nations irrelevant, or irrelevant to the key questions.
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the United States ratified?1 10 The Convention might be a useful shortcut for
determining foreign law, at least if one believes that foreign states ratified the
Convention because they believed that torture is never justified and that foreign
states act consistently with the Convention. A court with limited resources
might do better by consulting the Convention than by consulting the law and
practices of each party to the Convention, as long as it recognizes that practices
may diverge. But should the Convention count for more than evidence that its
parties oppose torture?
Our comments above suggest not: at best, the Convention aggregates the
information of its parties. As for the American "vote," the new statute
permitting torture simply reflects a new judgment by legislators about the
appropriateness of torture, so the Convention does not provide any information
about American attitudes or facts, except as they existed in the past. Thus, there
does not seem to be any reason for an American court adjudicating a
hypothetical torture statute to attach any weight to the Convention beyond
using it as a proxy for the laws of its other parties.
A further point, which has been made by Michael Ramsey,' is that many
international institutions that have been cited as authorities do not necessarily
.have independent information about international practices, and in some
instances may not have good incentives to report them honestly. A European
Union brief in the Atkins case, for example, cited a statement of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights as support for the statement that application of
the death penalty to mentally disabled people violates international norms.
1 1 2
The problem with relying on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights is not just
that many of its members are countries that engage in abusive human rights
practices: after all, maybe this just shows that applying the death penalty to
mentally disabled people is even worge than other human rights abuses. The
real problem, from the perspective of the Jury Theorem, is that the U.N.
Commission does not have any information that is unavailable to anyone else,
and that its collective judgment does not reflect wisdom that exceeds what can
be gleaned from independent examination of the national laws and decisions of
the states who are its members.
In sum, international treaties and the decisions of international courts are
best treated as proxies for the "votes" of the states that are parties to the
treaties; beyond this, they have no independent weight for the Condorcetian
judge. If fifty states have ratified a treaty that prohibits a particular action, and
the states appear to comply with their treaty obligations, then, in the best case,
the treaty (or the decision based on it) should be counted as fifty votes. The
110. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988),
1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
111. See Ramsey, supra note 106, at 74-75.
112. Id. at 79.
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treaty itself should not have influence beyond this function as a proxy: it should
not be treated as an extra vote or, otherwise, as a special source of information.
When evidence suggests that some states entered into the treaty for ulterior
motives or refuse to obey it, then the treaty's value as a proxy should
accordingly be discounted. And when international commissions render
decisions that are not based on private information about facts (moral or non-
moral), these decisions should not be given any weight.
VI. JUDICIAL COMPETENCE AND A FRAMEWORK
We now turn to a large question that we have bracketed throughout. How,
if at all, can courts (or other institutions, such as legislatures and administrative
agencies) undertake the relevant inquiries?
A. Issues ofAdministrability
The Jury Theorem implicitly assumes that the person who implements the
policy chosen by the jury will adequately interpret the jurors' votes. In the
actual jury setting, this assumption is harmless: jurors clearly vote "guilty" or
"not guilty," and the judge can accordingly order the internment or release of
the defendant. In the setting of comparative constitutionalism, the assumption
becomes more problematic. Can judges reliably interpret foreign materials so
that they can tell whether a particular law or decision should be considered a
"vote" in favor of some moral norm, empirical fact, or policy? 113 More
generally, can they assess the three relevant conditions?
Our analysis so far might seem to suggest that the proper use of foreign
materials requires such exhaustive information about foreign norms and
institutions that judges could not possibly use foreign materials properly. Here,
we think, is the strongest argument against the use of comparative materials, to
the effect that the best inquiry is so complex, so unlikely to be helpful, and so
likely to produce error, that it should not be undertaken at all. Note as well that
an emphasis on the question of competence might, as a first approximation,
support the use of "comparative law" in the domestic context, by suggesting
that the relevant inquiries will generally argue that one state should pay
attention to the views of other states, while also suggesting that the same
inquiries counsel against attention by the U.S. Supreme Court to the views of
other high courts. On this view, an intuitive but plausible understanding of
decision costs and error costs justifies use of comparative law in the domestic
setting, but not internationally. Perhaps state courts derive much benefit from
the use of decisions by other state courts because they learn a great deal without
113. Critics include POSNER, supra note 73; Alford, supra note 4; Anderson, supra
note 4; Posner, supra note 31. Tushnet acknowledges the force of this criticism. Tushnet,
Knowing Less, supra note 4.
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running into intractable problems of assessing the relevant conditions. Perhaps
the opposite conclusion holds for national courts deciding whether to consult
materials of other nations. If so, an interesting mystery would remain, which is
why so many courts, in interpreting their own constitutions, do refer to the
practices of other nations. 
1 14
Suppose, however, that comparative constitutionalism may be challenged
because of problems of judicial competence. 115 When judges are required to
make difficult decisions based on complex facts, the usual response is not to
direct them to ignore the facts. On the contrary, the standard alternative is to
provide a doctrinal framework-a set of rules-that simplifies the factual
analysis. These rules typically direct judges to ignore facts that are unlikely to
be relevant or to rely on presumptions that reflect what is generally accepted.
The standard trade-off is between bright-line rules and standards: the more that
the law embodies a rule, the lower the decision costs and the greater the error
costs. When decision costs are high, errors are tolerable, and rules should be
used. In extreme cases, the decision and error costs may be so high that the
optimal rule would simply forbid courts to take account of the relevant facts;
but such a conclusion is premature for comparative constitutionalism, 116 as
standard practices throughout the world tend to suggest.
B. Principles
To discipline the inquiry, consider a few possibilities. These are designed
for any English-speaking high court, but they could easily be adapted by courts
of many different kinds.
" The Condorcet Jury Theorem teaches that the informational value of an
additional vote declines rapidly after a certain number of votes have
been registered. In other words, surveying ten countries is much more
important than surveying five; but surveying 190 countries adds little
beyond a survey of 185. Perhaps, then, judges should survey the legal
materials of ten or twenty other (relevant) countries, and not try to
survey the legal materials of all 190 or so countries. This will allow
them to spend more time avoiding errors, and will reduce the aggregate
information by very little. As we have suggested, a point of this sort
strengthens the idea that the U.S. Supreme Court should restrict itself to
the practices of other democracies.
" As we noted, the value of using foreign legal materials depends on there
being an accurate gauge of the sentiments and judgments of the
114. See supra notes 19-27.
115. An additional problem is that use of comparative materials puts new
informational demands on litigants, who must learn about, and argue over, the practices of
other nations. See Gonzales, supra note 29. At the domestic level, this is a less forceful
objection, simply because the cases are both easily available and intelligible.
116. See Tushnet, Knowing Less, supra note 4.
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population. This point suggests that judges should not survey the legal
materials of foreign nations that have highly authoritarian or
dysfunctional institutions. We suspect that there is, for similar reasons,
little reason to consult the legal materials of nations with small
populations, which are the overwhelming majority.
" Judges should consult nations whose legal materials are translated into
English and adequately understood in the English-speaking world.
" Judges should favor recent sources over old sources because the recent
sources are more likely to reflect modem conditions.
" Judges should be alert to cascades, which are most likely when uniform
legal change occurs rapidly without much debate or deliberation across
different countries.
Taken together, these principles suggest that English-speaking courts
should probably confine themselves to only about ten or twenty countries,
including the Westem liberal democracies, plus countries like India, Japan,
Brazil, Israel, and South Korea. The precise set of countries might
appropriately be constant across cases (a bright-line rule), or it might be better
to have the set depend on the type of case. In any event, we think that if courts
are to take comparative constitutionalism seriously, they should be required to
go through each of the countries in the relevant set and describe explicitly in
the opinion whether the outcomes in those countries are consistent and support
the constitutional interpretation advanced by the court. It may be that this level
of care is unnecessary in most cases. But when the Supreme Court of Ireland,
the Constitutional Court of South Africa, or the Supreme Court of Australia is
consulting foreign practices, principles of these kinds should help to discipline
and systematize the inquiry. In most cases, the analysis should be relatively
straightforward. Where foreign law is most useful, it is because there is a
consensus or strong majority on one or another side, and it is usually simple to
establish that fact. State courts often examine the practices of other states in
search of a clear majority position, and the same can easily be done, most of the
time, at the international level.
Because the legitimate sources of American constitutional law are sharply
disputed, some people will reject the claim that a framework of this sort should
be used in the United States. l11 But some of these principles already exist,
albeit in nascent form, in the U.S. Supreme Court opinions that rely on foreign
legal materials. Although Atkins too casually claimed that the "world
community" rejected capital punishment of the mentally retarded, 1 8 and Roper
also referred to the rejection of the juvenile death penalty by nearly the entire
world,1 9 Lawrence limited itself to Western Europe, 120 and so did other earlier
117. See, e.g., Gonzales, supra note 29.
118. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,316 n.21 (2002).
119. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
120. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003). Note that some members of the
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cases. 12 1 The problem is that none of the relevant decisions provided anything
like a systematic account of the relevant laws, and for this reason they can be
legitimately criticized. If such an account would be too difficult, then courts
should limit themselves to a few countries, so that one can be confident of their
assessment of the laws, rather than surveying the entire world. 
122
The general point is that the imperfection of judges does not imply that
judges should refuse to consult foreign law on the ground that they are
incompetent to do so. Intermediate bright-line rules can guide them so that they
rely on the right sort of facts and not the wrong sort of facts. Although in
principle the optimal decision rule might forbid judges to engage in
comparative constitutionalism because of the empirical difficulties, 123 this
conclusion seems speculative and premature. As we have suggested, the very
fact that the high courts of so many nations engage in this practice counts
against the speculation. It may be too much to contend that the pervasiveness of
the practice suggests a Condorcetian argument in favor of a Condorcetian
procedure. But at the very least, the fact that the practice is common raises a
cautionary note about those who would confidently dismiss it.
C. A Framework
Drawing the strands of the analysis together, we propose the following
formulation, designed both for state courts within the United States and for
high courts consulting the practices of other nations. Courts should use foreign
law to interpret constitutional provisions when the proper interpretation
requires factual or moral information, and that factual and moral information is
likely to be reflected in foreign legal materials. Foreign legal materials are
likely to be useful in this way when: (1) the foreign legal materials are
relatively uniform; (2) the foreign legal materials are the result of legislative or
judicial judgments in the foreign states; (3) the problems addressed by those
materials are relatively similar; and (4) the foreign legal materials reflect
relatively independent judgments.
Within the United States, the standard practice of consulting the law of
other states reflects this idea. In private law, the practice of determining the law
in a particular state by reference to the "majority rule" is so common as to be
virtually invisible; this is also usually what state courts do when they rely on
restatements. It is well known but nonetheless worth emphasizing that when
state courts rely on cases from other jurisdictions, they are relying on "foreign
ECHR are not in Western Europe.
121. E.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988).
122. Ramsey points out that the casual citation to world opinion in Atkins is not
adequately supported; the EU brief on which it relied did not contain adequate sources.
Ramsey, supra note 106, at 78-79.
123. Note also that sometimes the right theory of constitutional interpretation may
make such materials infrequently relevant. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
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law," unlike, say, a federal court that relies on a federal decision in another
state or circuit. The implicit rationale for state law comparativism is that the
state courts understand themselves to be addressing similar problems despite
cultural, historical, institutional, and demographic differences across states. The
Condorcet Jury Theorem helps to explain the general practice.
With respect to non-American cases, the American court should first
discard the legal materials of the foreign states that do not meet conditions (2),
(3), and (4). The court should then determine whether the remaining legal
materials are uniform and occur in a nontrivial number of states (say, five or
more). Some useful proxies may further narrow discretion. A court might
simplify its task by considering only relatively recent laws and decisions (under
point 2), by considering only the laws of states that have similar problems
along the relevant dimension (under point 3), and by considering only laws that
appear to be the result of substantial legislative process or litigation (under
point 4).
This framework might work better for some cases than others. If the
applicable theory of interpretation makes international practice irrelevant, the
argument for consulting international practice is over before it begins. Recall
that originalists will make only a limited space for such consultation, and for
originalists, our argument will apply only within that space. 124 Other theories
of interpretation might also impose constraints on the use of international
practice. In addition, much depends on whether judges are capable of
evaluating whether these conditions are satisfied. But in our view, this proposal
offers a good starting point. 125
D. Beyond Courts
Our analysis of judicial decision-making might easily be generalized; it has
broad applications to other types of decision-making. Non-judicial officials-
including presidents, decision-makers in regulatory agencies, and legislators-
can also benefit from looking at the laws and institutions of other states.
Indeed, this practice is so common and entrenched as to be almost invisible.
Leaders of newly independent states after World War II, and states emerging
from communism after the Cold War, made basic choices about market and
democratic institutions after observing the experiences of successful states.
American state legislatures frequently imitate the lawmaking of legislatures in
other states. Megan's Law and three-strikes laws are among the most well
known of countless examples. 1
26
124. See supra note 34.
125. Other proposals, such as Glensy's (which overlaps ours in some respects), are ad
hoc and not derived from a plausible theory about the costs and benefits of comparative
constitutionalism. See Glensy, supra note 4. Similarly, Ramsey's four principles are sensible
and valuable but also have an ad hoc character. See Ramsey, supra note 106, at 69-70.
126. See Daniel M. Filler, Terrorism, Panic, and Pedophilia, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y &
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Foreign governments have frequently imitated the United States as well as
each other-consider the deregulation and privatization movement over the last
several decades, and the more recent influence of cost-benefit analysis and
tradable permit programs.1 27 And the U.S. government has occasionally
imitated other states as well. In all of these cases, the decision-makers
considered the experiences in other states because these experiences provided
valuable information about the likely effects of the law or program in question.
Not all of these cases were successes; some states learned more from other
foreign institutions than other states did. The process of learning, we suggest, is
appropriately disciplined by a framework of the general sort proposed here.
VII. SOME EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
Our argument has had a normative orientation, but it also has some testable
empirical implications. It is plausible to suppose that state courts and foreign
national courts implicitly rely on Condorcetian logic when consulting the
decisions of other states or nation-states. The arithmetic may not be familiar,
but it is intuitive to think that if a large number of states have chosen to do X,
there is reason to believe that X is right. If Condorcetian logic is indeed at
work, we can derive two noteworthy hypotheses.
A. The Young State Hypothesis
Some states are younger than others in a political sense. Alaska and Hawaii
are younger than Massachusetts. Israel is younger than the United States. Many
nation-states are old but have recently undergone a revolution or acquired
radically new institutions-South Africa, Hungary, China, the Czech Republic,
Poland, and others. These nation-states are "young" in our sense. We
hypothesize that young states are more likely to rely on foreign law than old
states are. The reason is that young states have more to learn, and old states
have more entrenched practices that are harder to change.
Anecdotal evidence on behalf of this hypothesis is the frequently noted fact
that American courts relied heavily on the law of Britain in the early years of
the republic but rarely consult foreign law today. 12 8 In addition, the frequently
L. 345, 360-64 (2003) (describing rapid adoption of Megan's Law by states, although
ascribing it to panic); Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent
Effect of California's Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 160
(2002) (describing states' adoption of three-strikes laws).
127. See ROBERT W. HAHN, REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
(2000).
128. See Ulrich Drobnig, The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, in THE USE OF
COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS, supra note 19, at 21 (noting that the United States relied on
foreign law to a greater extent in the nineteenth century and that Japan followed a similar
pattern in the first three decades of the twentieth century). Calabresi and Zimdahl find in
historical survey that the Supreme Court relies on foreign sources today more than in the
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cited examples of consultations mostly come from young states such as
Israel, 129 South Africa, 130 and Hungary. 131 It would be useful to test this
hypothesis on American state courts. Do Alaskan courts consult the law of
other states more than Massachusetts courts do, controlling for population and
legal activity? If so, this would support the Condorcetian hypothesis.
In fact, we can find more systematic support for that hypothesis from the
evident fact that within American courts, citations to sister states have been
decreasing over time. In Montana, for example, 50% of citations were to out-
of-state courts in 1914-1915, 39% in 1954-1955, and merely 7% in 1994.132 A
similar decline has been found in California. 133 In Minnesota, out-of-state
citations were common in the early years, but have diminished over time with
the development of in-state constitutional precedent; 134 this is precisely the
pattern we would predict on Condorcetian grounds. A broader study, involving
sixteen state supreme courts from 1870 to 1970, shows a significant decline in
citations to out-of-state law.135 As states built up their own jurisprudences,
there is a reduced need to rely on sister states for relevant information. Note in
this regard the straightforward prediction for South Africa: "As the Court gains
experience and precedents take root, the Court's need to canvass international
and foreign comparative jurisprudence for insights and guidance may
diminish."' 136
B. The Good State Hypothesis
Some states are "better" than others. The population is healthier, freer,
happier, and wealthier. It is reasonable to think that better states have better
institutions, 137.and therefore that states that seek to improve the well-being of
their citizens will copy the institutions of the more successful states. As we
noted above, during the Meiji restoration the Japanese establishment carefully
and self-consciously surveyed foreign institutions and tried to establish
distant past, although it has always relied on them to some extent. See Calabresi & Zimdahl,
supra note 4. Although the article does not control for caseload, types of cases, and other
relevant factors, it is a good start to the inquiry. Even more interesting would be a study of
the practices of lower courts.
129. See supra note 22.
130. See supra note 21.
131. See Ethan Klingsberg, Judicial Review and Hungary's Transition from
Communism to Democracy: The Constitutional Court, the Continuity of Law, and the
Redefinition of Property Rights, 1992 BYU L. REv. 41, 78-82.
132. See Snyder, supra note 12.
133. See Merryman, supra note 13.
134. See Hedin, supra note 16.
135. See Friedman et al., supra note 15, at 801-09.
136. Webb, supra note 21, at 281.
137. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 222 (1999).
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domestic versions of those that they thought were superior. Similarly, courts
might believe that they should consult the foreign materials of "good" states
while ignoring those of "bad" states. The reason follows from the logic of the
Jury Theorem: states should consult comparative materials because of the
information they convey, and the practices of some states are more likely to
convey relevant information than the practices of others. The "votes" of good
states are more likely to be correct than the votes of bad states; thus, a court
facing resource constraints and unable to survey the legal materials of all states
should focus on the better states.
Evidence in support of this hypothesis is that foreign courts typically
consult the legal materials of the Western liberal democracies, and not of failed
states such as the Soviet Union or authoritarian states such as China and
Cuba. 138 Domestically, the data also provide some support for the hypothesis.
From 1870 to 1970, state supreme courts cited the opinions of the New York,
Massachusetts, and California courts much more frequently than the opinions
of other courts; other frequently cited courts include those of Illinois, Michigan,
New Jersey, and Minnesota. 139 All of these states are among the wealthier
states in the country. It is also worth noting that the citation dominance of New
York, Massachusetts, and California has declined since the nineteenth
century. 140 This trend could reflect their loss of relative position as the South
reemerged, wealth and population spread through the country, and other states
built up their own jurisprudences.
The argument for focusing on good states is that resource constraints may
prevent courts from relying on all states, as Condorcetian principles require.
Still, as long as bad states are likely to be right with a probability greater than
one half, their legal materials are a valuable source of information. However,
American jurisprudence has discovered a useful device for aggregating the
information of all states in such a way that judges can benefit from this
information without doing their own surveys, case by case. This device is the
restatement. Restatements reflect the aggregated wisdom-the majority rule-
of all states, and hence show an implicit Condorcetian logic as well. 141 Before
138. See Markesinis & Fedtke, supra note 21.
139. See Friedman et al., supra note 15, at 806-07; see also Peter Harris, Ecology and
Culture in the Communication of Precedent Among State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 19
LAW & Soc'y REV. 449 (1985).
140. Friedman et al., supra note 15, at 806-07. Harris, supra note 139, found that state
courts tend to cite courts from more populous and more urban states; these states are
generally wealthier than other states. (Alaska is an exception.)
141. Note in addition that the United States Sentencing Guidelines were rooted not in
any theory of punishment but in an effort to use the average practice among trial judges. See
Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 14-19 (1988). If most trial judges were deciding better
than randomly, there would be a firm Condorcetian logic behind this choice. Similarly,
federal bankruptcy exemptions enacted in 1978 were, roughly, the median of existing state
exemptions. See Richard Hynes et al., The Political Economy of Property Exemption Laws,
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the restatement project began in the 1920s, one would have expected a heavy
citation bias in favor of the good states; as the restatements were published, the
bias should have declined as states increasingly relied on the restatements. As
noted above, the dominance of the good states has declined over time; however,
we do not have evidence about restatement citations. We hypothesize that
restatement citations displaced citations to good states; this hypothesis is of
course testable.
C. Competing Theories
Both of the principal hypotheses discussed so far should be compared to
those that might be derived from other theories of comparative
constitutionalism. We will briefly consider two such theories: the theory that
courts consult foreign law not for information, but because they seek, as much
as possible, to harmonize domestic and foreign law-in order to ease cross-
border transactions 142-and the theory that courts choose among foreign legal
materials partly on the basis of political or symbolic agendas. 143 A third theory,
the rationalization theory, which holds that courts cite foreign law in order to
rationalize decisions based on personal preferences, 144 does not have any
testable implications, as far as we can tell, and so we will not address it.
Although the theory follows from the attitudinal model advanced by many
political scientists, for which there is some evidence, 145 no one has explained
why judges who decide according to personal preferences would cite foreign
materials in some opinions and not others, and why some judges who decide
according to personal preferences cite foreign materials and other judges who
decide according to personal preferences do not.
The harmonization hypothesis reflects a common belief about the behavior
of state courts in the United States. This theory does not imply as strongly as
the Condorcetian theory does that state courts would more frequently consult
legal materials from older or wealthier states. Instead, it implies that state
courts would use foreign legal materials even when there is no possibility of
obtaining information from them. Some evidence supports the harmonization
hypothesis: state courts more frequently cite courts from the states in the same
47 J.L. & ECON. 19, 28 (2004). If state legislators decided better than randomly, the federal
approach would follow Condorcetian logic.
142. See Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 746-49 (1999) (describing and
criticizing this theory).
143. See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation, in
GOVERNANCE WN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253 (Joseph S. Nye Jr. & John D. Donohue eds.,
2000).
144. See Posner, supra note 31.
145. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
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region. 146 If, as seems likely, most cross-border transactions occur across
neighboring states, the regional bias in citation practices supports the
harmonization thesis. However, if regional proximity also indicates similarity,
the evidence also supports the Condorcetian view. Interestingly, a stronger
empirical effect is that state courts cite courts from states from which they have
drawn migrants. 147 If most cross-border transactions are between states
connected by migration, this evidence supports the harmonization thesis.
However, there is no reason to believe that transactions are correlated with
migration. More likely, the bias in favor of states that send migrants reflects the
similarity condition of the Condorcet theory, namely, that similar states provide
more relevant "votes" than different states, where culture is an important aspect
of similarity.
The global version of the harmonization thesis implies that national courts
will cite national courts from nation-states with which the home state has
significant trade relationships, at least for areas of law touching on transactions.
The major trading partners of the United States include Canada, China,
Germany, Japan, Mexico, and the United Kingdom. 148 The U.S. Supreme
Court does not seem inclined to cite China's, Japan's, or Mexico's decisions.
Canada's largest trading partner is the United States, yet the Canadian Supreme
Court avoids citing the U.S. Supreme Court. 149 Although firm conclusions
should await a formal test--one that determines whether correlations exist
between citation and trade or other cross-border transactions, holding relevant
variables constant-the anecdotal evidence we have cited suggests that the
harmonization thesis is an unpromising account of foreign citation practices.
The geopolitics theory suggests that geopolitics explain the pattern of
citation. Frederick Schauer argues that courts might cite the legal materials of
nation-states that are allies and avoid citing the materials of rivals or historic
enemies. 150 He observes, for example, that the Canadian Supreme Court avoids
citing the U.S. Supreme Court, which, in his view, might be a product of
Canadian sensitivity about being perceived as a fifty-first state. He also
observes that the Irish Supreme Court avoids citing British law, and argues that
this may reflect the historic enmity between these two countries. We could
extend this argument. The Israeli Supreme Court does not much cite the law of
the Arab states, and vice versa, and we suspect that the India Supreme Court
does not cite the decisions of Pakistani courts.
146. See Harris, supra note 139, at 451.
147. Id. at 467-68, 476-77.
148. BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION TRENDS 18 tbl.3 (2003), available at
http://www.bts.gov/publications/us-international-trade and freight transportationtrends/2
003/html/table 03.html.
149. See Schauer, supra note 143, at 260.
150. Id.
October 2006]
STANFORD LA WREVIEW
However, Schauer's argument that citation practices reflect geopolitical
rivalries and alliances seems doubtful on other grounds. If Schauer's argument
is not just a reformation of the good state hypothesis, it must mean that courts
avoid citing the law of good states in order to make a symbolic point or play to
public opinion. Consider his claim that Canada's high court is frequently cited
by foreign courts because Canada is esteemed as a wealthy and secure country
that is not the United States. Although we have not found poll data on world
attitudes toward Canada, 15 1 we have found data about popular attitudes around
the world to other states or (in the case of Europe) regional entities. A poll of
the attitudes of people in thirty-three countries found that the state/entity
regarded most favorably was Europe, followed by Japan, France, Great Britain,
India, China, Russia, and the United States. 15 Yet, as far as the evidence
suggests, citations to the courts of Japan, India, China, and Russia are
uncommon. 
153
A further problem with the geopolitics theory is that it does not fit, or
imply anything special for, the behavior of the courts of American states.
Perhaps we might predict that states in the former Confederacy were less likely
to cite northern states after the Civil War than each other, and vice versa, and
perhaps we would expect that this effect would fade with time, as mutual
hostility diminished. This prediction is testable. Otherwise, American states are
not allies or rivals in the geopolitical sense, and it is hard to think of a domestic
analogy to Schauer's argument.
In sum, many testable hypotheses emerge from the Condorcetian theory
and its rivals. Existing studies and anecdotal evidence provide some suggestive
support for the Condorcetian view. 154 We suspect that courts are implicit
Condorcetians, and we have provided some evidence for the suspicion; but
more research would need to be done to provide confirmation.
CONCLUSION
One of our principal claims here is that the debate over consideration of
foreign law by the U.S. Supreme Court should be seen not in isolation, but
151. Canada is not independently assessed in recent studies of world opinion. See, e.g.,
World Public Opinion.org, Global Poll Finds Iran Viewed Negatively, Feb. 3, 2006,
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home page/1 68.php.
152. See id
153. See Markesinis & Fedtke, supra note 21.
154. A related question is the extent to which governments, as opposed to courts, apply
Condorcetian ideas. The political science literature on policy diffusion is relevant to this
question; one of its themes is that of empirically disentangling the extent to which
governments adopt similar policies because of learning versus jurisdictional competition.
See, e.g., William D. Berry & Brady Baybeck, Using Geographic Information Systems to
Study Interstate Competition, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 505 (2005). The advantage of studying
courts is that citations reveal lines of influence that can only be inferred from patterns of
governmental behavior.
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instead in the context of the frequent consultation, by state and national courts
alike, of law that is "foreign" in the sense that it does not emanate from the
particular sovereign whose law is being interpreted. We have suggested that the
pervasiveness of this practice is best understood by reference to the Condorcet
Jury Theorem: if many courts have decided on a particular course of action, and
if each of them is likely to make choices that are better than random, there is
excellent reason to believe that this course of action is right. The Jury Theorem
disciplines the intuition that underlies current arguments on behalf of
consulting foreign law, which is that the practices of other states provide
valuable information. The Jury Theorem shows that when many courts have
adopted a course of action, it makes a great deal of sense to attend to their
shared practice.
But this judgment holds only if three conditions have been met. First, the
courts in question must be making judgments based on private information.
Second, those courts must be relevantly similar to the jurisdiction that is
consulting them. Third, the courts must have made their judgments
independently and must not be participating in a cascade. An understanding of
these conditions helps to explain the fact that in the United States, it is so much
less controversial for state courts to consult other state courts than for the
Supreme Court to consult other high courts. Most important, the similarity
condition is frequently met in the domestic case, whereas it is less clear that
other nations are relevantly similar to the United States for purposes of
interpreting disputed constitutional provisions. Perhaps the meaning of the U.S.
Constitution does not turn on factual or moral issues with respect to which
international consensus is relevant. Perhaps the meaning of other national
constitutions does turn, in part, on the existence of such a consensus.
We have not attempted to resolve such questions here; our analysis is
agnostic on the proper sources of constitutional interpretation. But whenever a
national court is concerned with establishing what is right, on facts or on
morality, such a consensus is legitimately brought to bear. The same point
applies to other public and even private institutions. For this reason, our
analysis of the Jury Theorem, and of the three conditions that bear on its
pertinence, has implications not only for judicial practices, but for legislative
and administrative behavior as well. And while our principal argument is
normative, we suggest, more tentatively, that an intuitive appreciation of the
Jury Theorem helps to explain both domestic and international behavior, much
of which seems to reflect an implicit Condorcetian logic.
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